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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa has been referred to as a country of “geological superlatives” because of its rich 
and diverse mineral resource base. Despite its unique endowment of precious metals and 
mineral resources, the country has fallen short of translating these resources into the required 
economic linkages that will lead to sustainable employment creation and economic 
emancipation for the majority of its people. Whilst the country has established, successful 
critical upstream industries based on its natural resource advantage, it has not managed to 
develop successful downstream value additions in most of its strategic value chains, most 
notably the chromium mineral value chain. 
This paper explores the significance of the chromium mineral value chain in the context of 
South Africa’s economic development trajectory, the dynamics between the mining and 
manufacturing sectors, the ongoing structural constraints, and the implications all these have 
on stainless steel fabrication. 
South Africa is a dominant player in chrome, consuming approximately 80% of the world’s 
chromite ore reserves and is undeniably one of the major producers of ferrochromium 
globally, with production accounting for approximately 34% of total world production. 
Despite a mature ferrochromium industry that boasts world-class ferrochromium 
manufacturing facilities and contributes massively to the domestic and global economies, a 
declining market share to China threatens the sector. The availability (or lack thereof) of 
power supply, high energy costs, uncompetitive domestic prices amongst other structural 
issues are contributing to this decline. 
The challenge remains in government, the mining industry, labour and all other affected 
stakeholders to engage robustly in order to preserve a value chain that possesses enough 
potential to enhance the development of the country, both socially and economically.  
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
South Africa has been referred to as a country of “geological superlatives”1 because of its 
rich and diverse minerals resource base2. These minerals consist of the platinum group metals 
(PGMs), gold, chromite, manganese, coal, iron ore, vanadium, copper, nickel, titanium, 
uranium, to mention but a few.  
An independent study of the country’s non-energy known mineral resources estimated it to be 
at USD 6.2 trillion (Baaitjies and Govender, 2012), and its mining sector the fifth largest in 
the world in terms of GDP. The mining sector alone accounts for approximately 18% of GDP 
(COM, 2012c, p.1) and over 50% in foreign exchange earnings. According to KPMG (2013), 
the sector brings in an annual income of more than R330 billion.   
The country is home to about 80% of the world’s chromite ore (or chromium ore – metal 
content of the ore) reserves and it is one of the major producers of ferrochromium, with 
production accounting for approximately 34% of total world production (Pan, 2013). 
Chromium is an important raw material used for the production of ferrochromium alloys used 
in special steels (stainless steel). More than 90% of the mined chromite ore is converted into 
different grades of ferrochromium by the metallurgical industry for use in stainless steel 
production.  
The chromium mineral value chain (CMVC) is identified as a critical contributor to the 
economic development path of South Africa. The country’s comparative advantage in 
chromite ore resources  enables it to establish resource processing industries (beneficiation) 
that could then provide the feedstocks for manufacturing and industrialisation, as well as the 
immediate market for inputs into these processes (extraction, smelting, refining, forming, 
fabrication (Jourdan, 2014, p.7). 
Despite these positives, the domestic ferrochromium industry is under threat with a rapidly 
declining market share to China, based on declining ferrochrome production in South Africa. 
The government recognises that the country's factor endowments have enabled it to partake in 
the global industry, and has provided the impetus for the development of key manufacturing 
and service sectors. However, inadequacies in physical infrastructure investment – more 
notably power supply constraints, high energy and labour costs, continuing labour disruptions 
as well as the widespread practice of monopoly pricing (IPP) of intermediate products (such 
as stainless steel) are negatively affecting the competitiveness of the ferrochromium value 
chain - thus inhibiting the growth potential of the domestic economy and consequently 
decreasing the economy's productive capacity (Kularatne, 2006, p.65). 
1 ANC State Intervention in the Minerals Sector (SIMS) Report, 2012, pp. 4. 
2 South Africa can no longer be considered a resource-based economy. Stevens (2003) and Nankani (1979) 
define a mineral-based economy as one whose share of net visible exports is anywhere between 20 and 40% 
(cited in Ville and Wicken, 2012). 
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Despite this huge resource endowment, the level of mineral beneficiation domestically has 
remained low, with the mining sector undertaking activities dominated by primary production 
whilst largely exporting raw or semi-processed minerals. Although this was not always the 
case, of late, the power supply constraints have been identified amongst the biggest causes 
behind this misfortune 
In addition, the beneficiation activities have tended to be more concentrated in the capital and 
energy-intensive sectors of the chromium mineral value (Balchin and Soko, 2012, p.9). 
Global competitiveness is fast becoming a key differentiator that separates the winners from 
the losers. Given the country’s history, South Africa has had to rethink its development 
strategy in order to remain competitive. If the intention is to go beyond its comparative 
advantage in mineral resources, the manner in which beneficiation is implemented (and the 
policy environment accompanying this strategy) will determine the success of the country’s 
growth. The alternative is that the country will fail to maximise on these depleting resources.   
In 2011, the SA Cabinet officially adopted beneficiation as the official strategy that seeks to 
translate the country’s sheer comparative advantage inherited from mineral resources 
endowment to a national competitive advantage. The strategy has since been criticised for not 
putting sufficient focus on downstream value addition. Dr. Iraj Abedian contends that 
beneficiation should include both upstream and downstream linkages otherwise this could 
“restrict the potential to derive the maximum economic benefits from the country’s key 
mining sector.” 
The challenge therefore, is to enforce a development strategy that will launch the domestic 
economy beyond a net exporter of raw minerals. This requires the participation and support 
of all market players, including government, business and labour. 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) of 2002 came into effect 
as an attempt to legislate the vision of the Minerals Policy. One particular objective of the 
Act was to entrench the State’s role as owner and custodian of South Africa’s mineral wealth 
by changing the mineral rights system from being privately owned to being exclusively state-
owned. The purpose of the Act was to promote economic growth through increased 
beneficiation of mineral production; to ensure that mining contributes to rural development 
through employment opportunities and advancement of social and economic welfare; to 
ensure that holders of rights contribute towards socio-economic programmes through the 
implementation of proactive social and labour plans (Cawood, 2004, p.58).  
According to SIMS (2012), the study further called for a critical analysis of the existing 
mining sector, including potential and actual upstream and downstream sectors; mineral-
related logistics; energy and environmental sustainability challenges and opportunities; to 
present regulation and legislations – including the licensing regulations and the Mining 
Charter.  
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The growth and expansion of the South African economy around the mining sector led to the 
development of the ‘Minerals-Energy Complex’ or MEC (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, p.5)3. 
Rustomjee and Fine (1996) maintain that the MEC not only dominates the economy, but it is 
by far the largest contributor to South Africa’s GDP, exports, capital formation and 
employment. It is considered critical to the creation of input-output linkages, but also because 
of its specific ownership structure and its relation to the financial sector and the State (Wild 
and Schwank, 2008, p. 2). 
Until 2007, many mineral value chain investments benefitted from SA’s low-cost power 
advantage, but the State’s failure to give Eskom approval to commence new plants in the 
mid-1990s turned SA’s power surplus into a deficit in 2008, eventually leading to tariff 
increases in the last few years (Jourdan, 2014, p.7).  
In 2005, Eskom embarked on a capacity expansion programme to build additional power 
stations and major power lines to meet the country’s rising demand for electricity. The 
Medupi and Kusile coal-fired power stations are the latest two being built.  
According to the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR, 2011), this transition has partly 
resulted in the construction of a number of large scale resource-based investment projects, 
including Columbus Stainless Steel, Saldanha Steel, Lion  Ferrochrome smelter and others. 
The government acknowledges that whilst there needs to be a more coordinated and 
streamlined approach to the beneficiation strategy, such improvements demonstrate the 
country’s state of readiness for value addition, albeit currently in a less orderly manner. 
Given that the mining industry has greater economic multipliers than most primary industries, 
much of the problem lies with the manner in which political interference has beset the 
industry as a result of the perceived lack of economic benefit derived from it. The dynamics 
between the industry, the political landscape (given the country’s history) and other affected 
market players such as labour will be explored further to root out the deep-rooted issues.  
 
SECTION 2: OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINING INDUSTRY AND 
METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Setting the Political Landscape 
Mining has been the driving force behind South Africa’s economy for more than 130 years. 
Since its existence, the industry has shaped the country’s socio-political and economic 
development (KPMG, 2013).   
3 The MEC formed the core of the domestic economy since the end of the nineteenth century. These economic 
sub-sectors – consisting of mining and certain sub-sectors of manufacturing which are closely linked to mining 
and are particularly energy-intensive (i.e. the electricity, transport and storage sectors) - were established by 
mining conglomerates (SIMS, 2012, p.5) 
3 | P a g e  
 
                                                 
A Political and Economic Review of Chromium Mineral Value Beneficiation in South Africa 
and its role in the country’s development path 
 
In 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) was elected as the country’s first black-
majority led democratic government. The party’s key policies included creating a better life 
for all the people of South Africa.  
 The Freedom Charter of 1955 inspired the ideology of the ANC stating clearly that “The 
national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people. 
The mineral wealth beneath the soil…shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a 
whole” (SIMS, 2012, p.3).  
In an effort to accelerate the ideology of the Freedom Charter, the ANC government 
promulgated the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) 28 of 2002, 
which enforced that the State shall be granted exclusive ownership and custodianship of the 
country’s mineral wealth from private ownership. This meant that the State had greater 
authority in the granting of legal rights on mineral and petroleum properties. The other 
objectives of the Act were to promote economic growth through increased beneficiation of 
mineral production; to ensure that mining contributes to rural development through 
employment opportunities and advancement of social and economic welfare; to ensure that 
holders of rights contribute towards socio-economic programmes through the implementation 
of proactive social and labour plans (Cawood, 2004, p.58).   
To achieve the above objectives, the government had to commit that any decisions taken in 
terms of the Act would be conducted within a reasonable time frame and in accordance with 
the principles of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness (Cawood, 2004; 
MPRDA, 2002).  
In 2011, the government identified five strategic mineral value chains that are intended to 
“demonstrate the inherent value for South Africa in embracing beneficiation for all mineral 
commodities” (DMR, 2011, p.12). The ANC reaffirmed their commitment to economic 
transformation at the party’s 53rd National Conference held in Mangaung in December 2012. 
This resolution reads as follows: “South Africa’s endowment of mineral resources belongs to 
the people as a whole through state custodianship, and should be governed by the democratic 
developmental state in the interests of all South Africans. Exploitation of minerals must 
optimise their developmental impact, especially job creation, across the economy. Mining 
must catalyse broader industrialisation through the realisation of all the potential backward 
and forward linkages, including a much greater degree of beneficiation.” 
The political history of the country ensued an economy that is extremely capital- and energy-
intensive, driven by resource extraction and the development of interrelated economic 
activities known as the ‘minerals-energy complex’ (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996, p.5). This 
complex comprises of mining, minerals processing, the energy sector and associated 
industries linked to these sectors. 
The state principally supported and exerted investment initiatives in these capital-intensive 
sectors linked to the MEC where, according to Black (1991), skilled and highly paid white 
workers would find jobs. Fine and Rustomjee (1996, p.191) reveal that while attempts were 
made to support manufacturing sectors such as textiles by means of a tariff policy, these 
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measures were found to be less effective and important than support for the MEC. 
Nevertheless the two main targets of post-democracy industrial support have been apparel 
and motor vehicles (MIDP/APDP)4 with disappointing results, whilst the minerals 
beneficiation/value addition sector has received almost no support, especially the minerals 
inputs sector (capital goods) that has, despite the lack, of support, displayed robust export 
growth over the last decade (see Kaplan D, 2011). 
Post the 1994 democratic elections, industrial development was influenced by restrictive 
macroeconomic framework conditions, witnessed by poor economic growth rates (Wild and 
Schwank, 2008, p.4). Research conducted by Makgetla (2004b) revealed that mining’s share 
in output declined and job losses increased significantly, mainly due to a shift from gold 
exports to platinum. In terms of value-added, Makgetla (2004b) - through her own 
calculations - discloses that MEC sectors grew at an annual rate of 1.92% between the period 
of 1990 and 2006. Non-MEC manufacturing sectors were calculated to have grown at far less 
levels, 1.11% per annum.     
In an effort to address the macroeconomic problems, social injustices and apartheid-linked 
infrastructure bottlenecks instituted by the apartheid era, the ANC government went on to 
employ three successive policy frameworks between 1994 and 2009 – the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy 
(GEAR) and the 2006 Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (AsgiSA) 
(ANC (1994); DTI (1996); AsgiSA (2006). The GEAR paid more attention to stabilising the 
macroeconomic environment; i.e. reducing the fiscal deficit and tighten monetary policy as 
these were thought to be conducive for investment (Weeks, 1999) and privatisation of state 
assets (see energy, above). Contrary to its objective of growing the employment levels, the 
reverse transpired. The policy has been criticised as not being an “integrated growth and 
development strategy” (Altman, 2001, p.694).  
In 2010, the government introduced another policy initiative known as the New Growth Path 
(NGP). The policy sets job creation as a leading priority (Zarenda, 2013) and viewed the 
mineral sector as a key job-driver (NGP, 2010, p.12). It further proposes the acceleration and 
“exploitation of mineral reserves by ensuring an effective review of the minerals rights 
regime, lowering the cost of critical inputs including logistics and skills in order to stimulate 
private investment in the mining sector, and setting up a state-owned mining company that 
would co-exist with a strong private mining sector and that promotes beneficiation, as well as 
4 The MIDP was initiated in 1995 to help the motor industry adjust to South Africa’s reintegration into 
the global economy. Prior to that time the industry was protected by tariffs in excess of 100 percent 
and burdensome local content requirements. Unsurprisingly it produced a very wide range of products 
at low scales of output and at high cost. It was a very inefficient import substitution sector that could 
not have competed either domestically or internationally in the face of immediate trade liberalization. The 
Automotive Production and Development Programme (APDP) replaced the Motor Industry Development 
Programme (MIDP) on January 1st, 2013. The program applies to light vehicles only, and that there are separate 
regulations to support future heavy vehicle production, which are covered at the end of this article [See 
NAACAM for more on this] 
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greater utilisation of the mineral resource base of the country for developmental purposes, 
including potentially through a sovereign wealth fund5.”   
The main direction of government policy with respect to mineral products is downstream 
beneficiation. Beneficiation features strongly in the National Industrial Policy Framework 
(NIPF) as well as in the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) (AMV Report6), which also 
targets upstream value addition (mineral extraction and processing inputs).     
The NGP recommends “Refocusing the beneficiation strategy to support fabrication (stage 
4) (rather than only smelting and refining, which are both capital and energy intensive), 
including stronger measures to address uncompetitive pricing of intermediate inputs, such as 
where appropriate, export taxes on selected mineral products linked to clear industrial 
strategies.” (NGP, 2010, p.12) 
The National Development Plan (NDP) came into effect between 2012/2013 as a policy 
framework for the country’s future economic and socio-economic development. Although the 
NDP has very little on resource-based development (Jourdan (2014), it does indirectly 
recognise MVC opportunities, citing “If these pitfalls are consciously avoided, and if the 
mineral endowments are used to facilitate long-term capabilities, these resources can serve 
as a springboard for a new wave of industrialisation and services for domestic use and 
exports (NGP, 2012) (Jourdan, 2014).” [See Appendix A for more on the NDP]. 
The government recognises that the country’s mineral endowments provide it with a sheer 
comparative advantage (DMR, 2011). Whether SA is able to use this advantage to generate 
the required levels of growth, build internationally competitive industries, attract foreign 
direct investment, create sustainable jobs and skills development and move towards a 
knowledge-based economy, remains an ongoing debate (CDE, 1998a; Chang, 1998; Altman, 
2001; DTI, 2002). 
2.2 Problem Statement 
This study seeks to analyse how well and to what extent the chromium mineral value chain 
can be beneficiated in order to sustainably grow South Africa’s economy beyond its current 
levels. The country’s resource advantage in chromite ore reserves affords it the opportunity to 
transform this into a competitive advantage similar to countries like Sweden and Finland. 
These economies have demonstrated how natural resources can be used to underpin 
industrialisation and create employment opportunities, expand the local skills and knowledge 
base, and achieve domestic and global competitiveness through the expansion of economic 
linkages – a far cry from South Africa’s reality (and that of most of Africa’s economies). Yet, 
South Africa – a resource rich and labour-abundant economy – struggles to leverage off its 
comparative advantage in minerals to achieve maximum benefits from beneficiation. The 
chromium mineral value chain is one such case in point that upholds this argument.  
5 The New Growth Path (NGP) 2010 “The New Growth Path: The Framework”, EDD, Pretoria 
6 AMV Report – ISG Bulletin 2: Optimizing mineral linkages needs a conscious policy approach 
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2.3 Research Aim and Objectives  
The aim of this paper is to explore whether the chromium mineral value chain has the 
potential to contribute much more meaningfully to South Africa’s economic development 
path in the context of the prevailing political economy. It is argued that chromium is 
important to the global chrome, ferrochromium and stainless steel value chains. 
The paper will seek to address this by engaging the implications of upstream and downstream 
mineral beneficiation in achieving economic diversification and expansion, whilst creating 
sustainable employment opportunities. 
The paper will also address the key challenges and constraints that have prevented the 
chromium mineral value chain from achieving maximum developmental gains, whilst 
tackling the political climate and ensuing dynamics between the mining and manufacturing 
industries, the government and the labour market. 
2.4 Research Question 
The over-arching question in this research paper is whether there is merit in beneficiating the 
chromium mineral value chain so as to develop South Africa’s economy beyond its current 
contribution. 
 
In order to answer the research question, the following sub-questions will be unpacked in the 
paper: 
a) What are the different dimensions (and critiques) of beneficiation and SA’s 
beneficiation strategy? 
b) How can SA translate its comparative advantage in chromite ore into a competitive 
advantage; and what are the spin-offs on the stainless steel value chain? 
c) What are the key challenges and constraints impeding the successful development of 
the chromium mineral value chain and economic linkages? 
d) What sort of interventions and policies are thus required in order to realise a 
successful beneficiation strategy? 
 
2.5 Rationale or Significance of the study 
This study presents an important contribution to the lack of available literature on the 
domestic chromium mineral value chain specifically, and the extensive economic linkage 
opportunities these ferrous minerals could unlock in order to aid South Africa towards 
achieving a sustainable social and economic development path.  
 
2.6 Research Methodology 
In order to answer the “how” and the extent to which the chromium mineral value chain can 
be developed further, the research applied a qualitative-analytical approach. This method 
enabled the author to investigate the ‘how and why’ in answering the research question. 
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The research also used semi-structured interviews that were answered by participants from 
the public and private sector, as well as subject experts (independent consultants) to address 
the question. The responses from the interview participants, together with the theoretical 
justifications for chromium beneficiation allowed for in-depth analysis and the opportunity to 
extract the differing views in order to summate the conclusion. 
 
The participants directly affected by the subject matter were chosen as follows: Government 
departments (Department of Mineral Resources and Department of Trade and Industry); the 
private sector (Chamber of Mines and Industrial Developnment Corporation); power utility 
(Eskom); Trade union (COSATU); and independent experts (proConsult – Dr Oliver Damm; 
IFAA – Professor Ben Turok and WITS Supervisor – Dr Paul Jourdan). In the end, only four 
interviews were had – these consisted of COSATU and the three independent consultants. 
The other interviews were unsuccessful on the basis of work commitments and unforeseen 
circumstances.   
  
The paper has twelve sections in total. Section 3 explores the claim that mineral resources 
tend to impact the economic growth of developing countries negatively, as well as various 
justifications for mineral beneficiation and associated economic linkages. Section 4 
contextualises the South African mining industry briefly. This is followed by Section 5 which 
provides the background to the composition of the domestic energy sector. This is important 
as it provides a basis for the ferrochromium mineral value chain. Section 6 explores the 
discourse around the merits in beneficiating the chromium mineral value. Section 7 will 
expound on this by looking at the implications on the stainless steel value chain. Section 8 
will then provide the various challenges and constraints impacting the CMVC and Section 9 
will cover the policy views of the various stakeholders directly affected. Section 10 presents 
provide the overall recommendations and Section 11 will reflect on the discussions already 
covered. The paper will then close off with a conclusion. 
 
SECTION 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 A Neoclassical approach to the development of a mineral-based economy: New 
Structural Economics Theory 
In an economy juxtaposed by labour abundance and high unemployment such as South 
Africa’s, Black and Hasson (2012, p.2) make the point that in order to raise the output 
elasticity of employment, first and foremost, economic activities should become more labour 
intensive; secondly, there should be a shift in the composition of output to relatively labour-
intensive sectors.  
From a neoclassical perspective, Lin (2009) cautions against strategies that defy a country’s 
comparative advantage by supporting activities that are too capital or skill intensive. The new 
structural economics (NSE) theory argues that sustainable income growth is the foundation 
for poverty reduction and economic development. It further postulates that the best way for 
an economy to develop is to allow its factor endowments to change over time through 
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upgrading from a more labour and resource-intensive endowment structure, to one that is 
capital-intensive (Lin, 2012, p.6). When this is achieved, the economy will be most 
competitive, the economic surplus will be large, and the capital accumulation and upgrading 
of its factor endowment structure will be the fastest possible.  
The NSE theory has formed the basis for providing direction for the economic development 
of most first world countries. The theory is firmly rooted in its orthodox assumptions that 
hold much faith in the mechanism of the market. The NSE further creates the space for 
industrialisation strategies to occur, such as the global value chain development, vertical 
specialisation or resource-led industrialisation (Newman and Takala-Greenish, 2014). The 
role of the state, therefore, should be that of facilitating the economy, in industrial upgrading 
and solving coordination problems in the market - not necessarily to push its own agenda. 
In a resource rich and labour-abundant economy such as South Africa, economic 
development according to the NSE can be achieved if it follows its comparative advantage in 
developing resource-intensive industries, including extraction, forestry and agriculture. In 
addition to this, the NSE recommends that South Africa should develop its labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries as these industries can provide more jobs for the poor. They would 
also pave the basis for continuous upgrading to higher value-added industries, which will 
increase the wage rate (Lin, 2011, p74). Eventually, the development process will upgrade 
the country from a labour-intensive economy to a more capital-intensive industry as capital 
becomes more abundant.  
However, opponents strongly disagree with the manner in which the NSE supports industrial 
policy specifically in developing economies. The first limitation is that the NSE theory 
defines industrial policy to include both broad and specific or targeted aims without 
interrogating the context or the mechanisms that inform the accumulation and shift from one 
endowment structure to the next. Secondly, the NSE is said to assume that industrialisation is 
an automatic process, which relies on the notion that a static view in the micro context can 
represent the continuous and complex nature in the macro economy. Naude and Szirmai 
(2013, p.2) argue that industrialisation is not an automatic process, but that different types of 
industrial policies are necessary in different contexts and times. Thirdly, the NSE assumes 
that the categorisation of economic activity is possible and in response, an appropriate policy 
can be identified and implemented accordingly (Newman and Takala-Greenish, 2014).  
Altman (2001) made the point that some authors did not agree with the hypothesis that higher 
value-added higher productivity investments were appropriate in a labour surplus economy, 
such as South Africa’s. Altman argues that the only way for South Africa to form a 
sustainable industrial strategy is for it to support the development of higher productivity or 
higher value industries that will yield incomes high enough to support employment 
multipliers in low productivity, job-creating industries. In order to realise the labour-intensive 
downstream fabrication, industries need to invest in the capital-intensive precursors 
(feedstocks, such as steel and polymers). 
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Thus the market-led approach of the NSE is said to limit policy in identifying ways to 
upgrade the economy’s endowment structure, given the inherent market imperfections in the 
short run. In the long run, the NSE assumes that market forces and mechanisms are operating 
efficiently. In summary, the NSE does not take cognisance of cumulative linkages. Neither 
does it foster the diversity of different economic activities across diversified sectors 
(Newman and Takala-Greenish, 2014). 
In response to the NSE’s recommendations and after the RDP, GEAR and AsgiSA 
programmes failed to achieve their objectives, President Jacob Zuma adopted the New 
Growth Path (NGP) in 2010 as the official framework to create more inclusive economic 
growth by encouraging more labour absorptive economic activities. The NGP’s objectives are 
to create five million jobs by 2020 and it identifies six priority sectors – all of which are 
focused on infrastructures and rebuilding the productive sectors of the economy (DMR, 2011, 
p.iii). Mineral beneficiation is one of the priority growth nodes for job creation.  
3.2 Endogenous Growth Theory 
Endogenous growth theory holds that economic growth is driven primarily by endogenous 
and not external factors. Moreover, it postulates that growth is dependent on technological 
progress and diffusion, and that investing in capital, in the labour input and in knowledge will 
significantly contribute to economic growth. The growth theory further emphasizes that the 
strength of state institutions (and the lack of corruption) and the orientation of economic 
policy are good determinants of well developing economies (Altman, 2001). 
The neoclassical growth theory of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) assumes that the rate of 
technological progress is achieved independently of economic forces. Endogenous growth 
theory challenges this neoclassical view by proposing channels through which economic 
factors can influence the rate of technological progress, and hence the sustainability of 
economic growth. It asserts that innovation plays an integral role in inducing technological 
progress in the form of new products, dynamic processes and markets, many of which are the 
result of economic activities (Howitt et. al., 1998). Firms and therefore economies become 
more competitive through learning by doing and repeat-learning. Over time, this makes them 
more efficient through acquiring production experience. Eventually, a higher pace of 
economic activity is achieved.  
In addition, firms that spend on R&D and countries that formulate economic policies with 
respect to trade, competition, education, taxes and intellectual property are able to influence 
the rate of innovation in order to attain sustainable economic progress (Howitt et. al., 1998) 
The NDP indirectly identifies skills and technology development as being key drivers to 
MVC development (Jourdan, 2014, p.13; NGP, 2012). 
3.3 Global Value Chain Development (GVCD) as a strategy for industrial development 
With the recent re-emergence of industrial policy in the current era, GVCD as a strategy for 
industrial development has taken centre-stage as a promoter of value chains linked to natural 
resource abundance (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996; Morris et. al. 2012). 
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GVCD hails directly from the global value chain analysis, which describes the full range of 
activities that firms and workers perform to bring a product from its conception to end use 
and beyond (i.e. after-sales market). These activities generally include design, production, 
marketing, distribution, and support to the final consumer. Similarly, the term “commodity 
chain” refers to a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a finished 
product (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986, p.159). 
The GVC approach therefore analyses the global economy from two contrasting vantage 
points: top down and bottom up. The former examines how lead firms “govern” their global-
scale affiliate and supplier networks) whilst the latter questions how these business decisions 
affect the trajectory of economic and social “upgrading” or “downgrading” in specific 
countries and regions) (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011, p.4). This “upgrading” has 
important implications for a country as its economy can either move to higher value activities 
in GVCs in order to increase the benefits (e.g. security, profits, value-added, capabilities) 
from participating in global production (Gereffi et. al., 2005, p. 171); alternatively, the 
converse can occur. 
Given the abundance of minerals within Africa, ‘resource-based industrialisation’ (RBI) is 
seen as the promoter of high-value added activities in advancing African countries from the 
chains of the resource curse. The expected continuing demand of Africa’s natural resources – 
specifically from countries like China and others alike - provides opportunities for resource 
exporting countries to upgrade and diversify vertically along commodity chains that remain 
untapped or unexploited on the continent.  
3.4 The Resource Curse Argument  
One of the more influential ideas in recent development discourse and policy is the so-called 
‘resource curse’. The argument around the resource curse thesis is that mineral abundance, 
generally found in less developed countries, tends to generate poor growth performance and 
negative developmental outcomes compared to resource-poor countries that have enjoyed 
considerable economic success from diversifying their economies (Di John, 2010). The 
hypothesis observes that mineral exporting countries are the leading victims of this curse. It 
has been observed that South Africa, like most mineral-rich economies, is a victim of the 
resource curse theory. Studies by Auty (1990) suggest that economic and political factors 
have influenced the disappointing growth outcomes of resource abundant economies. 
Variants of the Argument 
1. According to Presbisch (1950), the origins of the resource curse were based on the 
structuralist theses of the 1950s, which focused on the decline in the terms of 
exchange between primary and manufactured products, the price volatility of primary 
products, as well as the limited linkages between the natural resource sector and the 
rest of the economy (Hirschman, 1958). Thus the model predicts that de-
industrialisation is the expected structural change that occurs following these 
commodity booms. 
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Yet, recent development economic thinking identifies positive externalities as coming 
from the manufacturing sector, not from natural resource sectors. Hirschman (1958), 
Seers (1964) and Baldwin (1966) promoted the view that beneficial forward and 
backward linkages from primary exports to the rest of the economy would be small. 
This is informed by the idea that manufacturing creates more economical and 
employment multipliers than natural resource sectors (Sachs and Warner, 1997, p.5).   
Di John (2010, p.1) puts this forth as possibly owing to a number of reasons, namely 
that  less developed economies tend to generate negative poor economic performance, 
growth collapses, high levels of corruption, ineffective governance and political 
instability. These natural resources are thus deemed to be more of a ‘curse’ than a 
‘blessing’.  
2. The Dutch disease concept refers to potential negative effects natural resource 
abundance and exchange rate appreciations can have for the rest of the economy (Di 
John, 2010, p.2). The potential danger of such booms is that it can render certain 
sectors, i.e. manufacturing, less competitive, thus generating de-industrialisation (and 
therefore a decline in production and employment). Auty (1993; 1994a; 1994b; 1998) 
observed that overvalued exchange rates – caused by mineral exports earnings – 
render low productivity investments uncompetitive. Volatile export prices also 
constrain growth in the balance of payments, commodity prices as well as relatively 
lower levels of national income per capita. The result is that the benefits of resource 
rich economies do not reach the financial objectives. 
 
3. Sachs and Warner (1997, p.3) observed the negative association between resource 
abundance and growth, particularly when the natural resource has high transport costs 
associated with it. In such cases, the availability of the mineral resource requires the 
introduction of new technology. According to Sachs and Warner (1995), the distortion 
is created by export booms in primary-commodity exporting countries. These 
distortions are said to linger on even after the boom subsides, thus affecting the 
structure of production and investment required for future growth.  
 
4. Some economists, including Auty (1995), Davis (1995) and Gylfason (1999) have 
argued that minerals are a “wasting asset” and cannot meaningfully contribute to a 
country’s development. However, Wright (2001) maintains that there are a number of 
developed  countries, including the United States, Canada, the Nordic states and of 
late Australia, that have demonstrated that a further processing and conversion of 
these acquired natural resources into finished goods of higher export sales value can 
bring economic success through economic diversification.  
These countries’ resource sectors evolved from having poor technologies based on 
low-cost labour in sectors characterised by highly-skilled, knowledge intensive and 
export-oriented activities. This diversification of the economy encourages the 
development of key industrial and service sectors directly linked to the resources 
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base, thus ensuring continuation and economic progress long after these resources 
have depleted (Porter, 1990) (Vuori & Yla-Anttila, 1992) (Pajarinen et al, 1998) 
(Karppi, 2001) (Wright, 2001). This strategy was the catalyst in generating upstream 
and downstream value addition in these, now, developed economies, which eventually 
gave rise to related and support industries and the creation of employment. Heeks 
(1998) makes the point that the resource-based operations provide the impetus for the 
taxation of associated profits to generate excess revenue for the state. In turn, the state 
should then invest in physical infrastructures, namely roads, rail, port facilities, 
power, and water supplies; in social infrastructure including schools, hospitals, and 
prisons as well as in productive infrastructure, namely factories. Consequently, the 
above would lead to employment and linkage creation within the resource sector and 
in support industries, effectively leading to economic diversification.  
3.5 The Rentier State – the ‘staples thesis’ and Rent-seeking behaviour 
In contrast to this negative view of mineral abundant economies, earlier ideas on the subject 
adopted a more positive association of this resource abundance and industrial growth, 
specifically in developed economies. The 'staple thesis' supported this thinking, which 
demonstrated that growth was originally stimulated by the export of primary products which 
subsequently attracted capital and labour, and further induced a more diversified production 
structure (Innis, 1930; Watkins, 1963). 
Rentier state models attempt to explain why state decision makers in natural resource 
abundant countries create and uphold growth-restricting policies by supporting rent-seeking 
behaviour (see Mahdavy, 1970; Karl, 1997; Auty, (2007). The proposition is that higher 
levels of mineral rents encourage rent-seeking and therefore corruption, as compared to those 
countries with lower mineral abundance.  
Proponents of the rentier state model suggest that reducing the state’s ‘unearned income’ 
from mineral rents will foster a peaceful existence between government and the mining 
companies (Center for Global Development, 2004, p.56-57). Those who oppose the rentier 
state theory argue that natural resource rents – only to the extent that the state appropriates 
them – should be identified as encouraging savings, foreign exchange, and relaxing fiscal 
constraints (Gelb & Associates, 1998, p.17-18). 
Another key structural problem identified by Black and Kahn (1998); and Klasen and 
Woolard (2000) is that the misallocation of mineral resource rents has left South Africa’s 
middle income status highly distorted. Whilst the country’s cost structure and market-
oriented production sectors reflect this status, other key indicators, namely the human 
development index, skills and knowledge base and export profile reflect a less developed 
economy.  
In South Africa, the state captures a very small share of resource rents. Based on observations 
made by Torvik (2002), Robinson et al. (2006) and Sandbu, (2006), this is largely because 
natural resources attract a large number of Pseudo-entrepreneurs with intentions to make 
profits rather than entrepreneurs whose priority is to run productive firms. Torvik (2002) 
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argues that such behaviours lead to an overall reduction in income (or lower welfare), rather 
than an increase. 
Altman (2001) argues that mineral rents enabled the government to by-pass the development 
of labour-absorbing industries in favour of highly capital-intensive energy and chemical 
industries. The consequences of this have been a distorted cost structure that has isolated a 
mass creation of jobs specifically in labour-intensive, low productivity exports.       
3.6 Economic linkages – the basis for beneficiation? 
Research by Wild and Schwank (2008) maintains that linkages form an integral part in the 
sectoral growth process of an economy. It is said that they provide economic and 
employment opportunities for upstream and downstream producers, thus shaping the 
development path of any economy. 
The Africa Mining Vision7 defines linkages in two ways: 1) quantitatively as inputs and 
outputs into mining operations, and 2) qualitatively, in terms of the relationships between 
sectors in the supply chain. 
According to the AMV Report, linkages force a country to consider how each participant in 
the market can interact with the other, and how value can be achieved by each participant at 
each stage of the value chain. It is observed that each stage of the mining process may have 
upstream, downstream, side stream and lateral linkages. The problem, according to the ISG 
Report, is that such linkages in most developing economies are not well developed, which 
partly elucidates the why a country like South Africa extracts and exports the bulk of its  
natural resources to international markets, thus forming stronger industry integration with 
these markets and not its own domestic markets. 
The ensuing linkages created between the different sectors, most notably the combined 
impact of the mining sector and the manufacturing sector have sparked debate in the 
theoretical approaches to economic growth (Wild and Schwank, 2008, p.2). German 
economist List (1950) stresses how the development process is important for building up 
productive capabilities, and how certain industrial activities initiate production and further 
stimulate productivity in other sectors of the economy. List (1950) singles out manufacturing 
as a favourable economic approach over agricultural production mainly because 
manufacturing activities lead to increases in productivity in all other sectors. Manufacturing 
is enlisted as the key that ensures institutional, infrastructural and political progress (ibid., p. 
230). 
It is also argued that in order to harness linkage opportunities, certain fundamental constraints 
need to be adequately addressed. These include deficiencies in knowledge intensive areas, 
particularly, human skill development and infrastructure bottlenecks. 
7 Africa Mining Vision, Optimizing mineral linkages needs a conscious policy approach, ISG Bulletin 2 
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In an effort to promote diversification in resource rich countries, Hirschman (1981) sees 
resource rents as the ideal tool to build linkages between the commodities sector and the 
industrial sector. Four types of linkages are distinguished below: 
a) Fiscal linkages: these consist of taxes, (including resource rent tax, corporate tax or 
indirect tax such as royalties, export tax etc.) which can possibly be used to promote 
industrial development in other sectors (UNECA & AU, 2011). 
b) Consumption linkages: this refers to the demand for the output of other sectors 
raised by incomes in the commodities sector. 
c) Production linkages: these include forward (value addition through processing and 
refining) and backward (supplying goods and services for the commodities sector). These are 
dependent on the “magnitude and technological intensity of production” (Hirschman, 1981). 
d) Horizontal linkages: developing capabilities in the  resource's sector that can help 
build other industrial sectors or services (UNECA, 2011). This can occur by reinvesting tax 
revenues in infrastructure development. 
The point Hirschman (1981) was making is that the development of these linkages, 
specifically production linkages, offers industrial diversification. But perhaps of greater 
importance, is that for the beneficiation to be successful, linkages across these pillars require 
coordination, integration and collaboration between the public (state) and private sectors. 
These sectors therefore need mutually beneficial relationships, a common vision and “joined-
up strategies” (Morris, Kaplinsky & Kaplan, 2012) that will ultimately benefit even the 
ordinary people of South Africa.  
With that said, Diestsche (2014) makes the point that industrial policies therefore need to be 
strategically designed such that they are supportive of this collaborative effort between the 
above-mentioned sectors. The key principle around the success of economic linkages is to 
adopt economic policies that are development oriented and that would harness the 
strengthening of these linkages. 
3.7 South Africa’s industrial structure 
According to Fine Rustomjee (1996) and Black & Roberts (2009), South Africa’s industrial 
structure characterises an economy dominated by a “minerals energy complex” (MEC). 
These MEC sectors consist of various mining activities and further processing into semi-
manufactured commodities so closely linked that the latter are understood to be more closely 
linked to mining than to manufacturing. 
The domestic industrial structure has historically been biased towards upstream, minerals-
related heavy industries. Accordingly, the policy orientation towards the industry was heavily 
influenced by the requirements of the apartheid regime – steel being an important example. 
Consequently, the development of key inputs for industries such as arms, meant that basic 
iron and steel production was developed through state-owned Iscor (Fine and Rustomjee, 
1996).  
15 | P a g e  
 
A Political and Economic Review of Chromium Mineral Value Beneficiation in South Africa 
and its role in the country’s development path 
 
Although South Africa’s manufacturing sector is considered underdeveloped, there are cases 
whereby the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system has classified beneficiation 
under mining if it happens at the mine and under manufacturing if it was undertaken at a 
different site (ISP, 1993). The SIC system therefore fails to separate manufacturing activities 
from mining activities. By reclassifying production and separating “true” manufacturing 
activities from mining, refining and processing, it then becomes clear that the minerals-
energy related commodities represents a mere 30% of South Africa’s GDP and 80% of its 
exports (Fine Rustomjee, 1996). 
Altman (2001) affirms the above discussion by adding that the slower growth in secondary 
and tertiary sectors can be attributed to a minerals-led economy largely influenced by 
apartheid diaspora, which effectively sanctioned the South African economy from 
participating alongside the rest of the world; it permitted only a few entrants and competitors 
in a small domestic market; it restricted the need for inclusive job seeking, “affordable cost of 
job search, and circulation of market information. These conditions were all created by the 
presence of import substitution industrialisation (ISI), international sanctions, legal 
restrictions on ownership of assets and businesses by the black population, and controls over 
the labour market and access to education.” In summary, the apartheid government 
intentionally undermined all the factors that underpinned a growing economy. This included 
the “efficient coordination of factor and product markets.” 
Jourdan (1994, p.6) also observed that part of the problem to employment creation lies in the 
fact that South Africa’s economy or industrial structure has not adequately exploited the 
employment intensive sectors within the minerals processing value chain. The value chain 
has five discrete phases, namely: 
• Raw material extraction 
• Beneficiation of raw materials (processing, smelting, refining) to intermediate 
products 
• Component manufacture 
• Sub-assembly 
• Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) 
 
Presently, the domestic agriculture and mining sectors are the only two known sectors that 
provide for their high employment intensity. The second phase, the resource processing stage, 
provides for low employment intensity due to the complex nature of the work as well an 
extremely high capital cost of employment (Jourdan, 1994, p.7). Although the third phase, 
known as component manufacture, is also characterised by a high level of employment 
intensity, this stage has only had limited success due to import parity pricing. This suggests 
that South Africa is stuck at the low employment-creation end of the processing spectrum. 
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SECTION 4: CONTEXTUALISING SOUTH AFRICA’S MINING HISTORY 
4.1 The birth of South Africa’s mining industry and the current state of the economy 
The transformation of South Africa’s economy from a predominantly agricultural economy to 
one of the most industrialised nations in Africa began in the late nineteenth century in an 
undeveloped interior known as the Witwatersrand Basin. The discovery of world-class 
diamonds and gold deposits laid the foundation for the birth of a mining industry that has 
essentially become an important contributor to South Africa’s economy (GCIS, 2012, p.21). 
The discovery of these precious minerals, together with challenges of accessing them, 
provided the initial impetus for industrialisation. Heavy equipment, power supplies and large 
forces of organised labour were therefore needed in order to extract and process underground 
ore deposits, triggering a series of spin-off activities in other sectors such as transport 
(railway system), power generation (coal mining), manufacturing, and commercial farming 
(Abedian & Standish, 1992) (Davis, 1994) (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996) (Mainhardi, 1997).  
Despite these opportunities,  Davis, 1994; Fine and Rustomjee, 1996; and Chang, 1998 argue 
that rapid growth and economic development  in the country  were held back by the 
prevailing economic structure of the time, including direct state involvement in the economy 
as well as the dominance of import substitution policies (and import parity pricing) between 
early 1920s and early 1990s.  
In current South Africa, the mining industry is one of the most developed industrial clusters 
with extensive science and technology research, expertise in geosciences (Baxter, 2012). 
4.2 The South African Energy sector 
4.2.1 Overview 
The South African energy sector has been and continues to play a critical role in the country’s 
development path (Davidson and Winkler, 2003). South Africa has the highest energy 
consumption on the continent, accounting for approximately 30% of total primary energy 
consumption in 2012. Eskom - the country’s primary energy utility - supplies roughly 95% of 
South Africa’s electricity and the remainder come from independent power producers (IPPs) 
and imports. 
Whilst the economy is energy-intensive by international standards, the intensity however, is 
not equally distributed in the economy – it is only concentrated in specific sectors of the 
economy – manufacturing and transport. 
Hughes et al. (2002)  contend that the reasons for the high energy intensity is due to the 
extraordinary use of coal in electricity, and the large number of energy-intensive enterprises, 
which are linked to the low prices of coal and electricity that have consistently been around 
40% of US average prices for the last four decades. Hughes maintains that while this has 
provided South Africa with a competitive advantage in minerals processing, it has also 
deterred investment in alternative energy supply, and more importantly, energy efficiency.  
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Compared to other countries, South Africa’s energy efficiency is on average significantly 
lower. 
Unfortunately, the security of supply remains a contentious issue. In the 1970s, Eskom’s 
35,408MW of coal plants were designed to run at 75% capacity factors; yet the IRP envisages 
these 30 year old plants to run at 85% capacity factors for the foreseeable future (AEY, 
2013). Analysts strongly oppose this view, citing the need for an introduction of new power 
sources to enter the market.   
Winkler and Marquand (2009) note that the development of the South African energy system 
can be divided into two related aspects: a) the development of an energy-industry complex, 
designed to drive the domestic industrialisation during the 20th century.  The development of 
a 'minerals-energy complex' structured this; and b) the development of ‘civil energy’, i.e. the 
provision of household, commerce and services. The latter is said to be largely influenced by, 
and subject to, the former, as well as to the economic and social policies of the apartheid 
regime. 
The current energy system is powered primarily by coal; however, South Africa plans to 
diversify its electricity generation mix. According to the DME (2004), coal comprises about 
70% of the country’s primary energy; crude oil comprises around 23%, natural gas around 
3%, nuclear energy8 around 3%. As for electricity generation, around 92% came from coal-
fired power stations (NER, 2004a). South Africa’s renewable energy-industry (comprising 
about 1%) is significantly small, but the country plans to expand renewable electricity 
capacity to 18,200 MW by 2030. To date, a total of 64 projects have been awarded to the 
private sector with investment totalling US$14 billion. The first projects are already on line. 
These projects are expected to generate 3,922 MW of renewable power (Eberhard, 2014, p.1). 
South Africa has one nuclear power plant, Koeberg, with installed capacity of 1,940 MW. 
The country plans to build six new nuclear power plants by 2030 which will generate 9,600 
MW of electricity (PWC, 2012). This nuclear build programme is already underway, as 
confirmed by Energy Minister Tina Joemat-Pettersson in Parliament on 19 May 20159. 
8 See DTI: IPAP 2014/2015-2016/2017 for more on Nuclear Energy, the key opportunities and constraints, pp. 
125 
9 South Africa to build 6 new nuclear power plants, 19 May 2015, www.mybroadband.co.za 
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Figure 1: Total primary energy consumption in South Africa, 2012 
 
 
4.2.2 Demand and Supply issues  
Eberhard (2003) argues that the construction of new power plants was put on hold and 
eventually cancelled during the apartheid era because the ruling government of the time was 
more concerned with energy security, overestimates of continued growth in demand and long 
lead times that led to large excess supply in the 1980s and 1990s.  
As can be seen on Figure 2 below, the demand for electricity has subsequently grown in 
response to the rapidly growing domestic economy. Yet as shown in Figure 3, South Africa 
continued to export the already deficient electricity. 
In the latter months of 2007, South Africa – a country which always had an excess electricity 
supply - started experiencing widespread rolling blackouts as demand exceeded supply, 
threatening to destabilise the national grid.  
Figure 2: Total volume of electricity produced by Eskom 
 
Source: StatsSA , Dec 2007-2002, Doc – P4141; Solidarity 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013; PWC, 2012 
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Figure 3: Total volume of electricity exported by Eskom 
 
Source: StatsSA , Dec 2002-2007, Doc – P4141; Solidarity 
4.2.3 Addressing the power crisis: Unpacking the reasons 
Since its establishment in 1923, Eskom has undergone a number of periods of almost 
complete autonomy (i.e. not subject to any form of parliamentary oversight, state auditing 
and financial controls); to greater regulation; oversupplying electricity, continuing blackouts, 
to electricity price increases (Koen, 2012, p.3).  
Eskom’s mandate at the time was to produce and supply electricity neither for profit or loss, 
while producing and distributing capacity at the lowest cost possible to meet the demands of 
mining and industrial companies.  
Real causes of the crisis10 
a) The attempted privatisation of Eskom in the 1990s saw the appointment of the 
Electricity Council to govern Eskom’s corporate body, which was made up from 
stakeholders from business and the municipalities (Koen, 2012, p.7). Consequently, 
the restructuring of the power utility resulted in an unmonitored electricity pricing 
policy11.   
b) One of the real causes behind the electricity crisis was due to the government’s 
decision in 2001 to prevent Eskom from building any new power stations despite 
several attempts government’s own official 1998 energy policy acknowledging the 
power shortage. 
c) Government’s failure to accept and act on the responsibilities of ownership: as an 
owner of the state utility, government’s incompetence (as cited in CDE Round Table 
no.10) have been exposed since it failed  to replace worn out machinery and capital 
assets swiftly,  as well as respond effectively to investing in newer power plants 
timeously to meet the growing demand. Moreover, government’s indecisiveness on 
creating more capacity early enough cost the South African economy from the 
possibility of attracting private generation. Consequently, the power supply shortage 
10 Michael Koen, The Eskom Factor: Power Politics and the Electricity Sector in South Africa. Based on the 
Research Report: The Electricity Governance Complex. Report 2012. 
11 The drafters of the new Act, who included members of Eskom’s legal department, managed to insert a clause 
that exempted Eskom from the requirement to have a license issued by the ECB (Electricity Control Board) and 
thus from having its prices regulated.   
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in South Africa has led to an increase in the cost of electricity that has more than 
doubled since 2008. A plan has been tabled to increase the electricity price by 16% 
every year from 2013 to 2018 (Pan, 2013, p.106). 
d) Eskom’s poor response to the difficult situation it was placed in by the government: 
Eskom was as equally responsible for the state of its affairs as it was unable to 
convince the government to permit it to build new power stations. Instead, the power 
utility placed much greater value on socio-political issues (i.e. racial transformation 
and affirmative action) than in finding solutions to the skills deficiency it needed to 
keep operations going. Moreover, Eskom failed to extend the favourable long-term 
contracts with major coal suppliers that had provided it with some of the cheapest coal 
in the world. 
e) Poor leadership by the Eskom board: in accordance with the views of some senior and 
experienced executives, Eskom’s board failed to provide the right skills, independent 
leadership, and long-term strategic direction to the management of the utility. Its 
governance structure has been criticised for being old-fashioned. 
With approximately 80% of world chrome ore reserves and being one of the major producers 
of ferrochrome, South Africa and all local ferrochrome producers are looking for alternatives 
that can use less electricity.  
Since ferrochrome production is energy-intensive, during the first quarter of 2012, Eskom 
offered to pay energy-intensive ferrochrome smelters in exchange for them temporarily 
shutting down their furnaces in order to save energy (ICDA, 2013). Several companies signed 
this buyback deal. Xstrata-Merafe Chrome Venture closed five furnaces including 
International Ferro Metals (IFM), Assmang and Mogale Alloys. Hernic Ferrochrome Ltd. and 
Ruukki SA signed the deal in May. At the end of 2012, Tata Steel KZN agreed to the 
buyback program. The power constraints clearly and absolutely limit the first step of the 
chromium mineral value chain (MVC) – that of electricity intensive ferrochrome production, 
and consequently the whole value chain. 
Increasing electricity tariffs has prompted greater electricity efficiency in smelting – e.g. 
Glencore’s Lion project (Primus technology from old CMI pre-reduction technology). As 
Slatter (1995) put it, the electric submerged arc furnace has dominated the smelting of 
chromite ores and it has become engrained as the recognised production unit for 
ferrochromium alloys. The submerged arc smelting of ferrochromium has become a mature 
or aging technology and the smelting costs are becoming increasingly difficult to manage. In 
order to preserve the future sustainability of the industry, ferrochromium producers are 
introducing new technologies to be more cost effective and to produce better products.  
 
SECTION 5: THE CASE FOR MINERAL BENEFICIATION 
5.1 Defining Beneficiation 
The DMR (2011) narrowly defines beneficiation (value addition) as the transformation of a 
primary material (produced by mining and extraction processes) to a more finished product of 
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a higher export sales value. The original definition of beneficiation, according to April (2009) 
referred only to smelting ore or extracting metal. The definition has since been broadened to 
include the five stages of manufacturing metal. Each successive level of processing permits 
the product to be sold at a higher price than the previous intermediate product or original raw 
material and adds value at each stage. Thus the ‘narrow’ definition excludes upstream value 
addition (i.e. local content in mining/smelting, reducing value addition (imports) at each 
stage). 
The broader definition of beneficiation is the sum of local value addition (excluding all 
imported inputs) and it encompasses the inclusion of all five mineral linkages, i.e. backward 
linkages into capital goods, services and consumables; forward linkages into manufacturing, 
logistics etc., spatial linkages (infrastructure), fiscal linkages (resource rent capture and 
deployment and knowledge linkages (R&D, HRD: skills formation etc. (Jourdan, 2013)12. 
 
The Beneficiation Strategy is supported by a number provisions within existing national 
policy and legislation, such as the Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa (1998), 
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, the Broad-Based Socio Economic 
Empowerment Charter, the Precious Metals Act, the Diamonds Amendment Act, the energy 
security plan as well as compliance with environmental protocols (DMR, 2011, p. 1). 
There are generally four stages involved in mineral beneficiation (DTI, IPAP 2014/2015 – 
2015/2016, p. 82) – see Figure 4 below: 
Figure 4: Four Stage Beneficiation Process 
 
 
• Stage 1 involves the primary stage of mining and extracting an ore or concentrate 
(minerals are not beneficiated) 
• Stage 2 converts the ore or concentrate into an intermediate product such as a metal 
or alloy. The production of intermediate products usually takes place in capital- and 
energy-intensive smelters and refineries (DTI, 2005, p.15). (Involves limited 
beneficiation) 
• Stage 3 transforms an intermediate good into a refined, semi-fabricated product 
suitable for use by both small and sophisticated enterprises. Employment levels are 
12  Mineral Value Chains (MVCs) Resource-based Industrialisation, Minister’s IPAP Update Briefing, Paul 
Jourdan, DTI, Tshwane, April 2013 
Source: Eco Partners, 2011 
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generally high and the degree of value-added increases substantially due to the 
inclusion of other resources and inputs such as skills and technology (DTI, 2005, 
p.15) 
• Stage 4 transforms the processed metal further into finished products of a large 
variety. The range of employment opportunities is significantly larger at this stage 
(represents maximum possible value addition) (DTI – IPAP 2014/2015 – 2016/2017, 
p.82) 
There is common agreement that there is currently little value-addition taking place in South  
Africa, specifically in the chromium mineral value chain as a result of the country largely 
exporting unbeneficiated or  semi-processed chromite ore, thus limiting employment creating 
opportunities. The Chamber of Mines (2000) on the other hand, is of the belief that the 
amount of downstream beneficiation already taking place in the country is grossly 
underestimated.  
Table 1: Stages of beneficiation and levels achieved 
 
As evidenced by Table 1 above, there are very low levels of beneficiation taking  place, 
especially in Stage 4 (fabrication stage) of the in the Chromium MVC. The DTI (2005, p.16) 
believes that this can be attributed to weak economic linkages and the problem of import 
parity pricing by upstream metals producers at Stages 2 and 3. It also believes that the 
shortage of knowledge and skills, as well as the low levels of investment is what are 
generally affecting the competitiveness of downstream firms at Stage 4. 
5.2 The Beneficiation Strategy and its Objectives 
In 2011, the SA Cabinet adopted the “Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of 
South Africa.”13 The Strategy is a framework aimed at promoting and facilitating 
beneficiation. It identifies ten strategic mineral commodities, amongst them, the chromium 
mineral value chain, which forms part of the Iron and Steel Value Chain. 
13 Department of Minerals Resources (DMR), 2011: A Beneficiation Strategy For The Minerals Industry Of 
South Africa 
Source: DTI, 2005:16 
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Although the concept is not new in the country, beneficiation has not been successful in 
addressing government’s key priorities of reducing poverty and unemployment through the 
contribution of the mining sector.  
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) desires that all four stages of manufacturing be 
developed domestically with the support of mining companies offering assistance to local 
communities. Yet there are countries – for example China – that are interested in acquiring 
South Africa’s minerals and metals for the development of their own economies. China 
prefers beneficiation to take place in China, though there are some Chinese companies who 
have shown a willingness to support local beneficiation (DTI, 2014). 
Yet South Africa faces a number of challenges for ferroalloy beneficiation with Eskom power 
shortages arguably an absolute constraint. The other challenge is the country’s impending 
laws against climate change (carbon tax) that aim to limit greenhouse gas emissions. 
Additionally, there seems to be no collaborative effort between government and the private 
sector – notably the financial sector and to some degree the mining sector – which would 
rather support the exports of unbeneficiated ore. 
The SIMS report of 2012 (cited in Jourdan, 2012) believes that there are two broad 
approaches to downstream value addition. The supply-driven approach starts with the 
mineral endowment and then develops value addition strategies for those minerals with major 
domestic resources (DMR, 2011). The second, known as the demand-driven approach, 
identifies which mineral inputs the economy needs for rapid job creation and then develops 
strategies for the cost effective supply of these inputs in the required beneficiated form 
(Jourdan, 2012).   
Given the cross-cutting nature of the issues that are necessary to promote beneficiation, the 
Chamber of Mines (2000) supports the view that there needs to be a coordinated strategic 
approach and a concerted effort by all stakeholders (i.e. labour, business and government) to 
facilitate greater beneficiation. This means that the Beneficiation Strategy needs to work with 
the existing policy frameworks of the National Development Plan (NDP), the NGP, IPAP5 
and the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP2010) as all these talk to beneficiation. These policies 
shall be explored later in the paper. 
5.3 A Critique of the Beneficiation Strategy 
The beneficiation process categories are divided up between mining and manufacturing, as 
demonstrated below: 
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Figure 5: The Role of Mining and Manufacturing in the Beneficiation Process 
 
According to Baxter (2013), mining and manufacturing have very distinct competencies 
and/or skills that the former does not have. The Chamber of Mines is of the view that mining 
has competencies in certain parts of the concentrating and/or smelting areas (hence its role is 
limited to Stages 1and 2 in Figure 5); whereas manufacturing companies have the core skills 
and competencies from refining to the fabrication of a final consumer product (hence its role 
is focused on Stage 3 and 4).  
The Chamber of Mines makes the point that manufacturing beneficiation should not be 
driven by the availability of raw materials, but rather it should be driven by competitive 
advantage issues such as cost competition production, skills and craftsmanship.  
The other critique on the Beneficiation Strategy is that whilst it is meant to be part of a 
broader policy and legislative framework “that leverages more value from the mining sector 
beyond taxes and royalties” (DMR/PCTI; 2014, p.31), it is restricted to downstream 
beneficiation (adding further value to the primary minerals generated by mining), or forward 
linkages. Unlike most developed countries such as Canada and Australia where upstream, and 
side-stream beneficiation industries have been given appropriate recognition and supported 
by their governments, it is argued that the South African government needs to pay more 
attention to supporting side-stream beneficiation. 
Economist Dr Iraj Abedian has argued for a broader definition of beneficiation, to include 
both upstream and downstream linkages around the mining industry, as well as the “spin-offs 
in related industries, such as water, power, transport, chemicals and telecommunications” 
(side-stream) because in his view, “the prevailing “downstream conception” of beneficiation 
could restrict the potential to derive the maximum economic benefits from the country’s key 
mining sector.”  
Professor Turok argues that the beneficiation strategy “would be very different to the 
nationalisation approach, which says ‘let’s grab the commodity and then government 
Source: Chamber of Mines, 2012 
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manipulate it in some way’. It will break down the mining and manufacturing process and see 
what capability exists in the value chain and where government should intervene.14”  
Lastly, while the beneficiation strategy identifies several constraints to downstream 
beneficiation, namely trade barriers, shortage of power supply, access to mineral feedstocks 
at developmental prices, etc., it fails to propose detailed strategies that can be implemented 
successfully, and it does not appear to challenge the existing policies and legislation by 
proposing amendments in order to enhance beneficiation. Jourdan (2012) makes the case that 
as “minerals are a state asset that are concessioned (leased)  for a mining company to 
extract, the conditions of the lease (license) are clearly the strongest instrument available to 
ensure greater value addition”.     
SECTION 6: BENEFICIATING THE CHROMIUM MINERAL VALUE CHAIN 
(CMVC) – IS THERE MERIT IN THIS? 
 
6.1 Overview of the Ferrochromium Industry 
South Africa is a dominant player in the ferrochrome industry. Not only is it the largest 
producer in the world, it also boasts the largest smelting capacity in the world, at just over 4.1 
million tons per annum. Unfortunately, the industry is in a transition phase since it has lost its 
competitive edge at producing ferrochrome cost effectively. Recent electricity hikes and 
electricity blackouts have significantly impacted domestic ferrochrome producers (IDC, 
2012, p.9).   
The South African ferrochromium industry was established in 1964 by Rand Mines, the 
largest holder of chromium ore reserves. Rand Mines researched the conversion of chromium 
ore to ferrochromium and formed RMB Alloys. This was shortly followed by the 
construction of the Southern Cross Stainless Steel Company, built in Middelburg (Jourdan, 
2013, p.70) and the construction of a stainless steel plant in 1966. Due to the domestic market 
being too small to support the factory as a profitable venture, RMB Alloys merged with 
Palmiet Chrome to form Middleburg Steel & Alloys (MS&A) in 1969. In the early 1970s, 
small disintegrated chromite mines were consolidated and recapitalised leading to the 
development of the ferrochromium industry.  
The Bushveld Igneous Complex located in South Africa holds approximately 80% of world 
chromite ore reserves (Pan, 2013), and it dominates global chromite ore production. This 
region covers large parts of the Northwest, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces. 
The chromium mineral value chain (which falls under the Iron and Steel Value Chain) has 
been identified by the South African government as an important sector that offers the 
country a competitive advantage. In the words of Deon Dreyer, MD, Xstrata: 
14 Carol Paton, Africa’s lack of beneficiation probed, 13 August 2012 
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“We must choose to maintain whatever advantage we have that enables us to retain our 
industrial capacity, keep people employed and produce skilled workers. Our ferrochromium 
industry has a hi-tech beneficiation capacity of 5 million tons a year and employs 200,000 
people directly and indirectly, contributes about R2.5bn in taxes a year and contributes R42 
billion to GDP. It is therefore a logical beneficiating mineral value chain to sustain and build 
upon.”  
The industry is by volume one of the most important feeders into manufacturing and job 
creation (Jourdan, 2013, p.7). It is therefore a logical beneficiating mineral value chain to 
sustain and build upon. 
It is argued that this current size of contribution is unlikely to continue for much longer. 
Despite the clear potential within the chromium mineral value chain, SA’s mining companies 
have been energetically exporting unprocessed chromite ore to China, dropping smelting 
capacity utilisation from 90% in 2004 to 74% or less now, due to power constraints. An 
increasing portion of this ore is supplied by local platinum producers (UG2), for whom this 
would otherwise be waste material. Regrettably, this action has devastating long-term effects 
for the domestic ferrochromium industry.  
Hinting at South Africa’s power supply constraint that was directly to blame for the 
challenges experienced by the sector, Dreyer (2012) affirmed that the country currently has 
“no policy to manage this trend, which is facilitating the de-industrialisation of a mature 
sector.” 
6.2 Key Sectors Driving the Chromium Mineral Value Chain 
a) The Stainless Steel Market 
The chromium sector is mainly driven by the stainless steel market, the largest consumer. The 
biggest driving force behind the demand for ferrochromium in the stainless steel value chain 
is that there is no other known substitute for it in the stainless steel production chain 
(Ideas1stResearch, 2010, p.4). Stainless steel is considered the most important end use market 
for chromite ore, as shown in Figure 6 below; however, more shall be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Figure 6: Chrome value chain and its applications 
 
 
Chromium induces hardness, toughness, corrosion and chemical resistance in steel. It is 
identified as an important alloying element and is vital to the production of high-quality 
stainless steel, high technology weaponry, super alloys for jet engines and other modern 
kitchenware appliances including food processors. When combined with iron and nickel, the 
alloy produced is known as nichrome, which is resistant to high temperatures and used to 
make heating units, ovens and other appliances (Jourdan, 2014).  
Of more importance perhaps, is that chromium has no substitute in stainless steel – the 
leading end use – or in super alloys, the major strategic end use. 
Chromite (the raw material) in conjunction with magnesia is utilised in the manufacture of 
heat-resisting (refractory) bricks used for the construction and maintenance of industrial 
furnaces, mainly in the steel industry. It is the sole source of chromium, which when 
beneficiated, can be used in metallurgy, refractories, foundries and chemical applications. 
Figure 7 below illustrates the three broad categories of chromium usage, namely: 
 Metallurgical (ferrochromium) (94%) 
 Refractory and Foundry Sands (chromite) (4%)  
 Chemicals (2%) 
 
i. Metallurgical Industry 
As demonstrated below, demand for chromium is primarily driven by the metallurgical 
industry that converts over 90% of the chromite ore into different grades of ferrochromium. 
Source: European Chemicals Bureau; IDC, 2007 
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The stainless steel industry in turn consumes over 80% of the ferrochromium produced 
(mainly high carbon/charge grade15) (Murthy, Tripathy & Kumar, 2011, p.375). 
Figure 7: Uses of Chromite Ore 
 
 
The addition of chromium in low alloy steels improves the hardness and toughness in 
engineering steels. Alloy cast irons for example, are a particular portion of the cast product 
use for chromium. They are applied in pumps, valves, pipes, rolls and wear plates (IDC, 
2007, p.9). 
ii. Refractory and Foundry Sands 
The high heat resistance of chromium ore is applied in various refractory bricks, castables 
and ramming mixes, while chromite foundry molding sands are used on account of their 
increased heat conductivity, which allows chilling of castings to improve their integrity (IDC, 
2007, p.11). 
iii. Chemicals 
Chromium chemicals offer permanence and colour stability. Natural materials such as 
leather, wood and timber are stabilised for durability.  
 
 
15 Charge chrome contains between 48-55% chrome and 6-8% carbon and is mainly used in the production of 
stainless steel. South African producers are major suppliers in this segment. 
High Carbon Ferrochrome contains over 60% chrome and 7-8% carbon and is mainly used in the production of 
alloy steel, other than stainless steel. Kazakhstan is the leading producer in this segment. 
Source: Heinz Pariser, Cliffs Analysis 
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b) Integrated nature of domestic producers 
South African ferrochrome producers have an integrated network which allows them huge 
cost advantages over key rivals, including China, as seen in Figure 8 below. Since the country 
has the advantage of chromite ore abundance, producers do not need to source it in the spot 
market. In a country like China, chromite ore makes up 66% of China’s total production 
costs, whereas in South Africa, it only represents 26%. 
Figure 8: Cash cost comparison between South Africa and China, 2008 
 
 
c) South Africa is an efficient producer of ferrochrome 
According to a report by Hatch, South Africa continues to be the most efficient producer of 
ferrochrome (see Figure 9). The country is considered to have optimal balance between wage 
and productivity cost. It must be made clear in this case that South Africa does not 
necessarily have the lowest wage cost when compared to countries like China, India, 
Kazakhstan and Zimbabwe, but it is the most productive/efficient producer of ferrochrome. In 
this case, South Africa compares well to a country like Scandinavia, except that wages there 
are four times higher than in South Africa (IDC, 2012, p.11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IDC, 2012 
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Figure 9: Wage costs vs. productivity levels in ferrochrome producing countries, 2009 
 
 
d) Supply and Demand Pressures 
South Africa has a huge surplus in ferrochrome production, hence the bulk of the country’ 
ferrochrome production is exported (IDC, 2012, p.15).  
Table 2 and 3 below illustrate the world ferrochrome production from 2005 to 2012. In 2012, 
South Africa was the world’s largest chromite ore producer and exporter, accounting for 
43.7% of total world output and 47.1% respectively; followed by Kazakhstan and India at 
14.1% and 12.9%, respectively.  
Table 2: World chromite ore reserves, Production and Sales: 2005 
 RESERVES PRODUCTION EXPORTS 
COUNTRY Mt % Rank Kt % Rank kt % Rank 
South 
Africa 
5 500 72.4 1 7 494 38.3 1    657 15.4 4 
Kazakhstan   320 4.2 3 3 581 18.5 2    920 21.6 2 
India    67 0.9 5 3 255  16.5 3 1 031 24.2 1 
Turkey   20 0.3 6   859 4.5 4    720 16.9 3 
Zimbabwe    930 12.2 2   820 4.3 5       0 0 - 
Russia W W -   772 4.0 6       0 0 - 
Brazil  17 0.2 7   677 3.5 7    115 2.7 6 
Finland   120 1.6 4   571 3.0 8 0 0 - 
Australia W W -   242 1.3 9     204 4.8 5 
Iran W W -   224 1.2 10     224 5.3 4 
Other   626 8.2 -   816 4.4      390 9.1 - 
TOTAL 7  600 100.
0 
 19 311 100.0     4 261 100.
0 
 
 
 
Source: IDC, 2012 
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Table 3: World chromite ore reserves, Production and Exports: 2012 
 RESERVES PRODUCTION EXPORTS 
COUNTRY Mt % Rank Kt % Rank kt % Rank 
South 
Africa 
6 751 74.1  1  11 310 43.7 1  5  546 47.1 1 
Kazakhstan    387   4.2 3    3 663 14.1 2     861   7.3 3 
India     54   0.6 6     3 
353 
12.9 3     329   2.8 8 
Turkey    220   2.4 4    2 378 9.2 4 2  183 18.5 2 
Russia - - -       660 2.5 5        0   0.0 12 
Oman - - -       591 2.3 6     538   4.6 4 
Brazil     18   0.2 7      588 2.3 7       29   0.2 10 
Pakistan - - -      572 2.2 8     480   4.1 6 
Finland    120   1.3 5      499 1.9 9      15   0.1 11 
Zimbabwe   930 10.2 2     468 1.8 10        0    0.0 12 
Australia - - -     461 1.8 11     501   4.3 5 
Iran - - -     448 1.7 12     448   3.8 7 
Albania - - -     310 1.2 13     309   2.6 9 
Other     626    6.9      602 2.3      536   4.6  
TOTAL   
2012 
  9 
106 
100  25 903 100  11 775 100  
                 
2011 
  9 
106 
  25 071   11 473   
 
 
From the tables, global chromite ore exports have more than doubled from 15% in 2005 to 
47% in 2012, suggesting that the government has chosen to increase ore exports instead of 
beneficiating the ore further. In response to this, ferrochromium producers have appealed to 
the government to introduce chromite ore export tax or quotas. As can be seen in Figure 8 
(add on pg 15), South Africa has much to gain from exporting ferrochrome relative to the 
chromite ore sales. The concern however, is that the growth trend in the export values of 
unbeneficiated chrome ore has been increasing more than that of ferrochromium. 
e) Employment 
According to available statistics from the Department of Mineral Resources, employment in 
the chrome mining and ferrochrome processing sectors grew by an average rate of 12% per 
annum. In nominal terms, employment grew from 5 026 in 2001 to 16 088 in 2011. This is 
largely due to the growth in export volumes and the entry of new players in the industry 
(IDC, 2012, p.21). 
SECTION 7: IMPLICATIONS ON THE STAINLESS STEEL VALUE CHAIN  
7.1 Introduction 
The above sections showed the significance of chromium to the metallurgical industry and 
how chromite ore is essential for the use in stainless steel production.  
Source: Heinz H. Panser (2013) 
               # International Chromium Development Association, 2013 
               Mineral Economics, 2013 
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Stainless steel is basically a low-carbon steel, which contains a minimum of 10.5% 
chromium. The metal contains non-corrosive properties largely because of the addition of 
chromium and the addition of other elements, namely molybdenum, nickel and/or nitrogen. It 
is also vital to note that it is chromium and not nickel that contributes the greatest towards 
corrosion resistance in stainless steel and furthermore, it is chromium that is used in stainless 
steel irrespective of what grade or series of stainless steel is manufactured (Ideas1stResearch, 
2010, p.12). Nickel increases strength, impact strength and toughness, while also improving 
resistance to oxidation and corrosion16.    
Stainless steel is considered a versatile commodity that takes on many applications 
throughout the economic value chain (see Figure 10 below), specifically in the consumer 
goods and construction sectors. Over the last decade, domestic consumption more than 
doubled. The biggest sectoral sector is the automotive industry (IDC, 2014). Stainless steel 
(that includes chromium) is used widely in various components of the exhaust system, 
particularly in catalytic converters (Ideas1stResearch, 2010, p.16). Other sectors that benefit 
from this metal include the cutlery and kitchenware (hollow-ware) industries; chemical, 
processing and oil & gas industries; power generation industry; food production and storage 
industry; architecture, building and construction; medical applications.  
Whilst there are broad opportunities to utilise stainless steel, imports dominate the 
downstream industries. At present, no less than 75% of stainless steel consumer goods are 
imported.  
Figure 10: Stainless steel value chain 
 
 
7.2 The South African Stainless Steel Industry 
Perhaps the single largest constraint acting against the domestic steel and stainless steel 
industry is the worldwide practice of import parity pricing (IPP). IPP is simply defined as 
“the price that a purchaser pays or can expect to pay for imported goods; which includes 
international transport costs and tariffs” (Wikipedia, UN World Food Program definition). 
Jourdan (1994, p.8) reveals two reasons for the existence of IPP in SA. Firstly, the absence of 
real competition drives IPP between upstream suppliers due to a relatively small domestic 
16 The Effect of Alloying Agents on Steel Properties. How do alloying agents benefit steel, Terrence Bell 
Jourdan, 2014 
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market and high economies of scale for several intermediate feedstocks (e.g. steel and 
petrochemicals). The second reason is driven by the absence of rivalry between upstream 
suppliers.  
Jourdan (1994) further makes the point that South Africa has no real regional rivalry within 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since the latter are devoid of any 
real level of industrial development for the production of intermediate mineral-based 
feedstocks. 
Columbus Steel is the dominant producer of stainless steel. At least 90% of the 
ferrochromium production is consumed in the production of stainless steel. Ferrochrome only 
represents between ca. 3-4% of the value in finished 300 series stainless steel product, 
depending on the stainless scrap ratio (Xstrata, 2010, p.1). It is further noted that whilst both 
nickel and stainless scrap are major materials in the production of 300 series stainless steel, 
South Africa is still reliant on the import of these metals, making it further disadvantaged by 
the absence of end use stainless steel markets.  
 The austenitic 300 series dominate global stainless steel production, which contains around 
8% nickel and 18% chromium. However, due to the high price of nickel, it constitutes around 
two-thirds or 60% of the raw material costs in making this alloy.  
A further disadvantage of the Columbus Stainless Steel plant17 is its inland location 
(Middleburg) resulting in high logistic costs for the export of its products as well as the 
import of inputs (i.e. nickel, ferronickel and stainless scrap) (Jourdan, 2013, p. 92). However, 
nickel is also a minimal cost driver in the low-Ni stainless steels (200 and 400 series) which 
have lower raw material costs than the 300 series. Thus, SA could have a comparative 
advantage in the production of low-nickel grades (200 series and 400 series) of stainless steel. 
These constitute over 40% of global consumption. Consideration should be made to build 
future plants producing these low-nickel grades closer to the coast (Jourdan, 2013, p. 89-90).   
7.2.1 Stainless steel world production 
According to IDC (2012, p.3) research, the global stainless steel industry consumes about 
66% of the global ferrochrome production. China – the world’s largest producer of stainless 
steel – produces 14.2 million tons. 
South Africa is a net exporter of stainless steel due to two main reasons:  
1) Increasing global production that is expected to rise through to 2016 to 42.2 million tons 
from 33.6 million tons in 2010 (refer to Figure 11). This is primarily driven by rising incomes 
and booming construction in BRICS countries; and  
2) Weak domestic demand. The 2008/2009 financial crisis drastically affected markets across 
the globe, especially the EU countries, Japan and the US18. Commodity prices collapsed and 
demand waned, affecting most construction industries. As a result, global demand for 
17 Columbus Stainless - South Africa's and Africa's only producer of stainless steel flat products 
18 Ideas 1st Research, Ferrochrome, March 2010. 
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stainless steel dropped significantly during the slowdown, and so did the market for 
ferrochromium 
 
Figure 11: Global stainless steel production 
 
 
7.2.2 China – a potential threat 
As stated earlier, China is the biggest importer of the chromite ore firstly because it lacks this 
commodity and secondly because it requires this commodity for stainless steel production. 
The table below demonstrates how Chinese imports have increased since 2005 and how 
South Africa has been its biggest supporter.  
COSATU spokesperson Patrick Craven (2014) agreed that South Africa had an opportunity 
to promote beneficiation if local cooperatives took over the manufacturing of the smallest 
components of high-value stainless steel goods (e.g. spoons, tools etc.) currently produced in 
China. 
 
SECTION 8: CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS TO UPSTREAM AND 
DOWNSTREAM BENEFICIATION  
8.1 Power: The cost and availability of electricity  
According to Steve Phiri, CEO of Merafe: “No major ferrochromium expansion is expected 
in South Africa for the next three years mainly due to power shortage” – ibid (n.d.). 
Power is a critical component in the production and conversion of chromite ore into 
ferrochromium. Unfortunately, ferrochromium production is a costly process as it is energy-
intensive by nature, consuming between 3,300 – 3,800kWh per ton of metal produced. It uses 
electric power that supplies the energy required to carry out the heating, melting and 
reduction reactions (Pan, 2013, p.106). The cost of electricity accounts for 35-40% of total 
production cost.  
Source: Ideas1st Research 
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Today, South Africa faces serious energy constraints instigated primarily by power shortages 
and escalating tariffs. These constraints have serious negative consequences on both the 
domestic and global ferrochrome industries.  
Since 2008, the cost of electricity has more than doubled and the National Energy Regulator 
South Africa (NERSA) together with Eskom have explicitly stated that electricity prices are 
expected to increase by an average of 16% for the next five years.  
Plans to tackle ongoing power shortages from Eskom amidst high energy costs are underway. 
This is very important since South Africa supplies between 40% and 45% of the world’s 
ferrochromium. With electricity prices expected to increase by 75% over the next decade 
before stabilising in 2020, ferrochromium producers are looking for alternatives that can use 
up less electricity (Ideas1stResearch, 2010, p.15). 
The 2003 White Paper on Renewable Energy19 (DME, 2003b) set a target of 10,000 GWh of 
final energy demand to be produced from renewable resources by 2010. The Energy 
Efficiency Strategy further set a target for national improvement in energy efficiency of 12% 
by 2015 (DME, 2005), yet there has been little has been done to implement these two 
mitigation strategies.  
In response to the electricity shortage, Eskom is building two power stations, namely Medupi 
and Kusile. Medupi will comprise 6 units totalling at 4788 MW of installed capacity. The 
first unit was scheduled to go online in 2012 and the last one is scheduled for commissioning 
by 2015. Kusile will comprise 6 units totalling 4800 MW of installed capacity. According to 
Eskom, the first unit is scheduled for commissioning in 2014 and the last one is scheduled for 
2018 (Ideas1stResearch, 2010, p.15).  
According to the IDC (2012, p.23), retrofitting cogeneration plants (i.e. electricity that is 
generated from waste heat and/or from waste combustible gases) at ferrochrome smelters 
offers a good alternative to improve their energy efficiency and to reduce their environmental 
impact. Mining companies like International Ferro metals Limited (IFM), Hernic and 
ArcelorMittal SA have already installed cogeneration plants at their respective sites, and 
there are still many more of these facilities being developed in the country, with at least five 
in ferrochrome smelters.  
The growing uptake of cogeneration plants is a good alternative of widening the energy mix, 
whilst at the same time, easing the current pressure on the electricity grid.  
The DTI (2005, p.52) notes that the varying use of electricity and the price agreements across 
the value chain differ significantly. For example, Stages 2 and 3 are highly energy-intensive, 
yet it is Stages 1 and 2 that are said to be the main beneficiaries of electricity. Whilst the 
primary and secondary producers get their supply directly from Eskom at pre-negotiated 
rates, the downstream producers have to pay higher municipal rates. There is also no 
19 See DTI: IPAP 2014/2015-2016/2017 for more on Renewable Energy and government’s plans around it as 
well as challenges regarding the future roll out, pp. 112 
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information available to indicate how much more downstream producers pay for electricity. 
The clear price disadvantage for downstream producers inhibits growth of the higher value 
added chromium sector.    
Figure 12 below benchmarks electricity costs for ferrochromium producers globally, 
illustrating that South African electricity prices are already high in an already constrained 
power supply environment. 
Figure 12: Average electricity rates for ferrochromium producing countries, US$/MWh 
 
 
8.2 Limited access to raw material for local beneficiation 
This constraint ensues from the current structural agreement of the mining industry geared 
towards the export orientation of raw (primary) materials, with the majority of current 
producers locked in long-term contracts with their international clients. Uncompetitive 
pricing structures used by some of these raw material producers hamper beneficiation to the 
final stages of the value chain, such as is the case in the local steel industry (DMR, 2011, 
p.5). 
8.3 Minerals Energy Complex (MEC) argument  
South Africa’s economic structure favours upstream concentration through investments in 
capital and energy-intensive upstream mineral exploitation and beneficiation (i.e. stage 1, 2 
and 3 beneficiation), to the detriment of expanding downstream labour-intensive industries 
and increasing economic diversification (i.e. stage 4 beneficiation). This dilemma needs to be 
corrected should the country wants to grow its economy (IDC, 2014).  
Source: CRU, Xstrata, 2010 
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8.4 Anti-competitive pricing of inputs  
The prevailing pricing mechanisms used by some raw and intermediate producers - most 
evident in the steel industry - hinder beneficiation of the chromium mineral value chain from 
being fully realised. The use of IPP (i.e. applying international prices on domestic raw and 
intermediate materials) renders the downstream value addition uncompetitive as the pricing 
mechanism does not consider proximity to production (IDC, 2014, p.21). 
Since the local stainless steel industry only has one producer, Columbus Stainless, it may 
exert market power over the prices of inputs such as nickel and stainless scrap into 
downstream production as well as due to its locational disadvantage to the coast.  
8.5 Infrastructure Bottlenecks 
Infrastructure investment has been at the helm of public policy debate in SA since the 
discovery of most precious metals in the nineteenth century. Jimenez (1995, p.2774) made 
the point that economic infrastructure existed primarily to support economic activities. The 
government’s renewed interest in infrastructure investment follows a long period of decline 
and stagnation (1976 – 2002) (Perkins, Fedderke &Luiz, 2005, p.212), which gave rise to 
numerous concerns in the private sector regarding unreliable and/or expensive infrastructure 
services.  
South Africa faces a shortage of railways, highways, and carrying capacity transportation that 
are negatively affecting the current beneficiation initiatives, especially when transporting 
ferrochrome from smelting plants to ports (DMR, 2011).  
Like Eskom, Transnet - the transportation parastatal - has been criticised for inefficiency. The 
Transnet Rail Freight recently announced that as much as R300 billion would be spent 
expanding the country’s rail infrastructure and rolling stock. By addressing these bottlenecks, 
it is expected that this will unlock the country’s growth potential and further develop linkages 
in other areas of the economy through the reduction of costs related to the production and 
exportation of beneficiated chrome.   
An important point addressed by April (2009, p.472) and Smith et al. (2008) is that 
infrastructure extends far beyond than just a physical frame. It also comprises the operating 
procedures, management practices, and developmental policies that facilitate the effective 
utilisation and development of the infrastructure in response to societal demand. South Africa 
still needs to get this right.  
8.6 The threat of raw chrome exports 
As emphasized throughout the paper, domestic ferrochrome producers are calling for 
government to halt the exportation of unbeneficiated chromite from the country, or impose 
high export taxes. The principle behind this action is that the exporting of chromite ore 
undermines the domestic beneficiation of chrome; consequently, putting the ferrochrome 
industry at risk. It is believed that not only will this lead to the loss of ferrochrome production 
capacity domestically, but it will lead to the de-industrustialisation of an already mature 
industry which has a lot of potential.  
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As per the IDC’s research, these arguments are not without merit. Figure 13 shows that 
chrome ore export volumes have risen considerably since 2002, reaching 1.93 million tons in 
2010. This alone represents 27% of domestic sales (IDC, 2012). 
Figure 13: Export sales vs. domestic sales of chrome ore, 2000 to 2010 
 
 
8.7 High relative cost structures  
The Industrial Development Corporation believes that South Africa’s relative cost structures 
for labour-intensive production are higher than those of its competitor countries. These costs 
include labour costs (such as wages and salaries), energy costs, as well as transportation and 
logistics costs. High cost structures undermine the country’s competitiveness and are further 
intensified by sustained currency appreciation and excessive volatility (IDC, 2014, p.21). 
8.8 Mineral Rights (Resource rent tax to fund knowledge linkages) 
There have been many reasons put forward for state participation in the mining sector, 
specifically the mineral energy complex in South Africa. Some of these reasons, according to 
the ANC SIMS (2012) report, include capturing a greater share of the rents (taxes, profits and 
dividends), regulating the private sector, building capacity in the public sector and addressing 
developmental goals outside, but directly linked to the mining sector (Ibid). These goals 
include investing in long-term knowledge and physical infrastructures; create labour-
absorbing employment.   
The government further understands that to do this requires greater policy coordination 
between the public and private sectors. The former needs to employ various (policy) 
instruments that will facilitate the development of the mineral sector in order to capture an 
equitable share of the rents generated, while the latter needs to be more transparent, 
supportive and forthcoming with respect to their participation (SIMS, 2012, p.28). 
Source: IDC, 2012 
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8.9 Skills & Research Development 
Altman (2001) credits the real wealth of a country to the technical skills and knowledge of its 
people rather than in its natural resources. Jourdan (2014, p.2) concedes that knowledge 
linkages are prerequisites for developing the crucial backward and forward beneficiation 
linkages. 
The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC, 2014) argues that the government needs to 
invest in and subsidise more academic and research and development (R&D) institutions. 
Such innovations require advanced technical skills that can be found in engineers and 
scientists (IDC, 2014). Presenting at the Parliamentary Colloquium on Beneficiation last year, 
the IDC identified that the strengthening research institutions, investing and investing in the 
material sciences and engineering and improve educational outcomes are pivotal to the 
country if it wants to ensure consistent breakthrough technology and innovative development 
programs that will create new products for beneficiation. 
8.10 Access to international markets for beneficiated products 
Earlier it was discussed that foreign markets (specifically developed countries) tend to 
impose higher tariffs for beneficiated goods and almost low or no tariffs for imported raw 
materials. This makes it challenging for developing economies to compete fairly with the rest 
of these advanced economies.       
SECTION 9: CONFLICTING POLICIES, VIEWS AND ANALYSES FROM THE 
STAKEHOLDERS (MINING INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, LABOUR UNIONS AND 
INDEPENDENT CONSULTANTS) 
9.1 The Mining sector (Represented by the Chamber of Mines) 
According to the Chamber of Mines, mining companies have expressed various concerns in 
the treatment of the mining industry as a political tactic. Baxter (COM, 2012) contends that 
post 1994, political interference has negatively affected the South African mining industry 
and the supply of strategic minerals. Since then, mining has fallen from 16 percent of GDP in 
1994 to about 6 percent, while countries like China and India, for example; continue to 
experience successful growth rates in their industrial sectors.   
The new mining rights order, issued in 1994, gave economic power to only a few blacks, 
especially ANC elites. The move has gone in a complete opposite direction from what the 
Freedom Charter of 1955 envisaged for the whole of South Africa’s citizens. Secondly, the 
DMR has made it difficult for mining companies to obtain mining licenses. Peter Leon - a 
mining expert - stated at a mining congress that regulatory issues played only a secondary 
role to geology when it came to the mining industry and that imposing and prioritising such 
issues was more harmful than good. 
The impasse between the government and mining companies is exacerbating the pricing 
structure set by government on mining companies. According to Turok (2014), administrative 
costs, plus uncertainties of supply are heavily influencing the pricing. This explains why 
mining companies are able to charge international prices of mined raw materials to local 
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customers, inevitably raising their profit margins. This is negatively affecting activities in 
downstream manufacturing. 
Although the COM claims to support beneficiation and seeks collaboration with other sectors 
of the economy, it insists on differentiating between ‘mining beneficiation’ and 
‘manufacturing beneficiation’ (Turok, 2014, p.5). The COM believes that mining companies’ 
primary objective is to focus on upstream activity; downstream beneficiation is but a 
secondary focus.  
The first reason to justify this is that the COM already believes the sector is “struggling” 
(COM, 2009), citing a fall in the sector’s real GDP figures since 1994, continuous labour 
unrest amidst high labour costs, loss-making in some deep level mines and uncertainty 
around the MPRDA. Secondly, the COM believes that South Africa is not yet at the point 
where it can compete globally with other countries at internationally determined prices; 
thirdly, the country is still operating at high (cash) costs as it lacks the required infrastructure 
and advanced machinery/technology to ensure consistent efficiency. 
The COM asserts that mining and manufacturing are two separate businesses, and the 
responsibility lies primarily with the government to assist the manufacturing sector, not the 
mining industry. 
9.2 The Government 
9.2.1 The MPRDA 
The African National Congress calls for the amendment of the MPRDA Act (2002) to 
maximise the developmental impacts. According to SIMS (2012), the objectives of the 
MPRDA do not currently include the maximisation of these impacts, mainly through job 
creation and the expansion of linkages to the rest of the economy. By revising these 
objectives, it is anticipated that the state would be permitted the right to impose the necessary 
conditions (i.e. backward, forward and knowledge and lateral linkage milestones every five 
years of the concession) on all prospecting or mining licenses. 
The ANC also calls for the amendment of the MPRDA and regulations to make provision for 
“strategic minerals”20 so that it would allow concessions or licenses to have “sales/pricing 
and other conditionality; and for unexploited deposits, give first option for developing them 
(prospecting license) to the state (SMC21)” (SIMS, 2012, p.35). 
9.2.2 Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) 
The ensuing tensions between government and the mining industry are ongoing. In October 
2002, the DMR adopted the Mining Charter (amended 2010) that was based on the provision 
of Section 100(2) of the MPRDA. The Charter called for the then minister of mineral 
resources Susan Shabangu to develop a broad-based socio-economic empowerment charter, 
20 PGMs – Platinum Group Metals (platinum, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium and osmium) 
21 State Minerals Company 
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which specified social responsible minimums, which the mining industry has to adhere to. In 
2011, the DMR adopted the Beneficiation Strategy for Minerals. 
Whilst it was challenging to secure a one-on-one interview with the Deputy Director-General 
of the DMR, Mosa Mabuza, the MPRDA Amendment Bill (Bill 15B, 2013) describes the 
government’s determination to ensure that the mining industry adheres to the “mine-gate 
price.” This is the price (excluding VAT and transportation costs) that will be charged to 
local beneficiators. The Amendment Act thus deliberately forces mining companies to levy 
competitive local prices to local customers, instead of the prevailing international prices.  
However, the DMR seems to have abandoned “developmental” pricing in their earlier version 
of the MPRDA Bill. This comes on the back of the Bill’s return to Parliament for 
reconsideration over what mining policy should be. Minister of Resources Ngoako 
Ramatlhodi said various industry participants were contesting the mine-gate price setting and 
he was examining the possibilities of testing some of the provisions and legalities of MPRDA 
Amendment Bill with the Constitutional Court to avoid negative repercussions later.22 
The Amendment Bill also calls for the Minister of Mineral Resources to regulate the mining 
industry with the objective of prioritising the country’s development concerns; to promote 
and secure the supply of minerals for beneficiation purposes; amongst others.     
Opponents against the Bill argue that it seeks to impose price controls and that it overlooks 
important obstacles crucial for ensuring successful and sustainable beneficiation, namely the 
power shortages, insufficient skills formation, infrastructural backlogs and high labour and 
input costs. The Bill is said to empower the Minister to introduce export controls on 
whichever minerals are considered “strategic”. This contradicts the view of the NDP that 
warns that these actions could render the mining operations unviable and financially 
constrained, thus leading to mine closures and significant job losses. A further argument is 
that the Bill further imposes restrictions on future investments by mining companies since the 
minerals they may seek to mine may be subject to state controls23.  
9.2.3 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
The DTI has always been in support of beneficiation, specifically the further industrialisation 
of the country. One of its publications, the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) in 2013/14 – 
2015/16 emphasized mineral beneficiation and argued for greater downstream beneficiation 
as well as the deepening of upstream value chains (Turok, 2014).  
Whilst the DTI has put in a lot of work in identifying strategic mineral value chains – 
including the iron ore/steel value chain - as well as in identifying industrial infrastructure 
constraints that the government needs to prioritise, it remains frustrated by the lack of intra-
governmental coordination (especially with the DMR) and progress by the government and 
22 Mining Weekly- Opposition Calls on President to Back Minister on Developmental Pricing Issue, Martin 
Creamer, 16 February 2015 
23 Draft Minerals Bill will discourage investment in SA - South African Institute of Race Relations, 11 
September 2013  
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the country’s restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. To date, the financial obligations 
pledged by the government have not been forthcoming at the expected rate (Turok, 2014, 
p.8).  
The DTI has also expressed dissatisfaction over major steel, plastic and polymer producers 
who charge international prices to local manufacturers. At Parliament’s recent colloquium on 
beneficiation held late 2014, Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies argued that since 
mineral resources were a depleting asset, the government together with private companies, 
will offer these resources at discount prices to ensure competitiveness in downstream 
industries. Minister Davies also called for scrap metal to be made available at discount prices 
to local users and he argued that some steel products that are currently being imported could 
be manufactured locally.  
Although he acknowledged that moving the country towards a fully-fledged beneficiating 
economy has its challenges, he added that “if we fail to decisively pursue beneficiation, we 
will relegate the SA economy to a place at the bottom end of the globalisation of labour, with 
serious consequences for our ability to generate income and employment” (SAGNA, 2014). 
He further conceded that “we do not have the luxury of debating whether to beneficiate our 
mineral wealth. We must harness the collective industrial capabilities of SA firms to map how 
to beneficiate and what enabling policies or support measures are required to ensure this 
happens successfully and for the benefit of all South Africans” (SAGNA, 2014).  
9.3 Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
The IDC fully supports the concept of mineral beneficiation.  
IDC Research Head Jorge Maia confirmed this belief in an interview with Engineering 
News24, stating that “the demand has been typically for South African commodities or 
relatively unbeneficiated products, which is not the kind of export basket that we would like 
to be reliant on going forward.” 
Nevertheless, it is of the view that government together with the private sector should 
collaborate in terms of prioritising which value chains the country should fully develop as not 
everything can be manufactured.  
The IDC (2014) believes that the chromium mineral value chain is an important value chain 
that should be pursued and fully supported given the fact that the country already has the 
comparative advantage in chromite ore reserves and it boasts world-class technological 
capabilities to support beneficiation. 
24 Martin Creamer: Raw export rise flies in face of beneficiation calls, Engineering News, 08 December 2010 
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9.4 The Democratic Alliance (DA) 
James Lorimer, the DA Shadow Minister of Mineral Resources, is of the view that the 
MPRDA Bill will “severely damage the mining and energy industries in our country.”25  
The MPRDA is termed a “crony enrichment bill” by the DA. The party is of the view that the 
Bill and South Africa’s current mining law do not provide adequate protection and certainty 
for mining companies and foreign investors. The uncertainty lies in the premise that the 
MPRDA Bill is a regulation and not legislation. This implies that it can easily be amended, be 
influenced by political interests (corruption) and often times, it is opaque, leaving investors in 
doubt about the safety of their long-term investments.  
The DA is also of the view that the MPRDA gives government the “power to nationalise at 
fire sale prices. In the words of the Bill: “‘free carried interest’ means a share in the net 
profits derived from the exercise of an exploration right or production right issued in terms of 
this Act as acquired by the State in terms of section 80(7) or section 84(6) as the case may be, 
despite the State not contributing to the capital expenditure” (MPRDA Amendment Bill, 
2013, p.4). 
In addition to this, the DA believes that the government is artificially coercing the mining 
industry to subsidise the manufacturing industry by providing the latter with lower priced 
inputs.  
SECTION 10: RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 Price stabilisation  
According to Xstrata (2012) South Africa needs to consider two important issues if it wants 
to maximise its resource endowment in chromite ore and enhance the beneficiation strategy. 
Firstly, it needs to create a competitive environment for beneficiation. This can be achieved 
by maximising the capacity utilisation of existing ferrochromium and then expand 
ferrochromium capacity. Secondly, the government needs to extend the life of the country’s 
mineral reserves through good resource management. To do this, the government needs to 
ensure a sustained balance between supply and demand in the market in order to improve the 
stability of prices.  
In an interview with Jourdan (2015), he recommended that the country’s biggest 
ferrochromium producers – Samancor Chrome, Hernic Ferrochrome, International Ferro 
Metals (IFM), Asa Metals and Tata Steel consolidate and potentially set up a ‘single channel 
export system’  (similar to OPEC), in which they would actively manage ferrochromium 
production by setting up production targets. In doing this, the supply of and demand for 
ferrochromium would be administered accordingly in relation to the economic environment. 
25 MPRDA Bill: Crony Enrichment Bill will result in job losses, 2013, James Lorimer – Democratic Alliance 
Shadow Minister of Mineral Resources 
44 | P a g e  
 
                                                 
A Political and Economic Review of Chromium Mineral Value Beneficiation in South Africa 
and its role in the country’s development path 
 
10.2 Export ore tariffs  
Ferrochromium producers have appealed to the government to implement an export tariff of 
approximately 100USD/tonne of chromite ore in order to encourage local beneficiation in 
line with the country’s beneficiation strategy, especially in the face of a power crisis. This is 
believed to increase ferrochromium production and yield greater domestic economic benefits. 
However, Pan-African Capital CEO, Dr Iraj Abedian argues that the export tariff is an 
unsustainable solution to the crisis that would cause a “short-term, knee-jerk reaction to 
specific developments in the market place” (Business Day, 2012). 
The export tariff constraints are stipulated in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) GATT 
export restrictions. The motivation against export tariffs is that they have the potential to 
suppress job creation and economic growth, especially in developing economies that are 
contending with severe (infra) structural problems – namely South Africa. Thus, whilst SA 
may not directly impose export tariffs on chromite ore, it can possibly regulate the production 
capacity of ferrochromium, and indirectly regulate the supply of chromite ore. 
10.3 Technology Innovations in the Smelting of Chromite Ore 
10.3.1 Smelting efficiency 
Ferrochrome smelting is known to be energy-intensive and a costly process. The Premus 
process - Xstrata’s CMI Premus technology in use at the Lion Ferrochrome plant in South 
Africa - has been found to be the lowest-cost and most energy-efficient ferrochrome smelting 
technology since it reduces electricity consumption by over 30% (Ugwuegbu, 2012). 
Jourdan’s (2014:41) recommendation to the power supply problem is for the government and 
Eskom to assess the efficacy of capital expenditure (capex) incentives, such as the old 37e 
(immediate tax write-offs)) and other instruments, in order to facilitate the migration of 
current technologies to more efficient configurations, including cogeneration. 
10.3.2 Smelter energy imports 
Government should facilitate the direct import of electricity by smelters from neighbouring 
countries. Not only is risk of supply is adequately managed, but the country will benefit from 
lower tariffs through underwriting “take or pay” contracts (Jourdan, 2014, p. 48). 
10.4 Substitutes for energy 
10.4.1 Shale gas  
The South African government hopes that shale gas will provide the country with a reliable 
alternative fuel to coal. A recent study undertaken by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA, 2013) estimated that South Africa holds approximately 390 trillion 
cubic feet (Tcf) of technically recoverable shale gas resources, which needs to be 
significantly reduced for economically recoverable amounts (refer to Figure 14).  
 
According to Jourdan (2014), shale gas has the potential to offer an alternative feedstock to 
compete with Sasol in the upstream. 
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Figure 14: SA Shale gas and renewable energy options 
 
 
 
These shale gas resources are located in the Karoo basin in the Whitehill (211 Tcf), Prince 
Albert (96 Tcf), and Collingham (82 Tcf) formations. The Whitehill Shale’s recovery rate 
and resource estimate were also reduced because of the geologic complexity, according to the 
EIA (2013) report. 
However, it was noted that only 1 Tcf of natural gas is needed to fuel 1,000MW of Combined 
Cycle Gas Turbines (‘’CCGT’’) for 25 years.  
10.4.2 Natural Gas  
Natural gas makes up only 3% of the total primary energy mix in South Africa; however, the 
government has shown its support in growing the share of natural gas to around 10% over the 
next decade (Peters, 2010) largely because it burns more cleanly than any other fossil fuel, 
emitting 50-70% less carbon dioxide (CO2) than coal in electricity generation. A modern gas-
fired power plant is also 40% more efficient than a coal-fired plant26.  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that enough natural gas exists to meet 
global demand for the next 250 years at today’s production rates (Shell n.d.). The Anadarko 
and Eni-led consortia recently discovered the Rovuma Basin in Mozambique, which contains 
gas of around 100 Tcf (Anadarko, 2012), while Eni recorded gas in place of 75 Tcf (ENI, 
2013).  
26 Shell: Natural gas: building a cleaner energy future, https://www.shell.com/zaf/future-energy/natural-gas.html 
 
Source: PASA; AEY- Standard Bank 
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As stated in a report by PWC (2012), natural gas is more preferred to coal as a substitute 
simply because of the efficiency in capital cost, construction lead times, fuel costs, total cost 
per kWh and energy diversification as shown in Figure 15 below. Natural gas is also the 
preferred fuel for combined cycle heat and power plants. In these plants the heat produced 
from generating electricity is used for industrial or domestic heating, raising overall 
efficiency (PWC, 2012).  
Figure 15: Life cycle analysis: coal vs. natural gas 
 
 
10.5 The Carbon Tax option 
The electricity sector, the metals industry, and the transport sector produce the vast majority 
of South Africa's CO2 emissions (about 80%). The electricity sector’s reliance on low-cost 
fossil fuels-based electricity generation is one of the main reasons for the carbon-intensive 
nature of our economy. These already high levels of GHG emissions were expected to 
increase as the economy grows. 
Government is of the view that South Africa needs to reduce GHG emissions by 34% by 
2020 and 42% by 2025 while working to ensure economic growth, increase employment, and 
reduce poverty and inequality (National Treasury, 2010). 
It is suggested that taxes should be applied directly on the emissions of CO2; however, since 
this may be an administrative complex and impractical exercise, two options are proposed: 
1. an upstream tax at the point where fuels enter the economy, according to their carbon 
content; or 
2.  a downstream tax on emitters at the point where fuels are combusted. The 
administrative costs and complexity of an upstream tax are significantly lower. 
Source: Jaramillo et al, 2007; PWC, 2012 
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Jourdan (2014, p.40) argues that imposing carbon tax could have dire consequences on 
economic growth, exports and fiscal revenues. Rather than penalties, well-crafted incentives 
should be introduced. 
10.6 Fiscal linkages  
The state argues that under the current fiscal regime, South Africa is not getting an equitable 
share of the resource rents generated from the country’s mineral resource. The SIMS (2012, 
p. 38) report makes the point that the mining industry (made up mostly of foreign ownership) 
benefitted significantly from the returns made by the country’s natural resources. Jourdan 
(2014) recommends that a resource rent tax (RRT) of 50% must be imposed on all mining. 
This RRT will trigger only after a normal return on investments has been achieved, therefore 
not impacting on marginal or low grade deposits. This ‘normal return’ is the RRT threshold 
that should be defined as the Treasury Long Bond Rate plus 7% (currently estimated to be 
15%). It is noted that a RRT of 50% would yield about R40 billion per annum at current 
prices. The SIMS (2012) Report further recommends that the RRT proceeds be kept in an 
offshore Sovereign Wealth Fund to improve the strengthening of the Rand during commodity 
booms. 
Once a local value addition is achieved, the recommendation is that the RRT 50% rate be 
reduced in order to encourage miners to facilitate downstream beneficiation (Jourdan, 2014, 
p.33). 
10.7 Stainless steel fabrication  
Steel products are vital inputs into labour-intensive manufacturing processes. However, the 
industry is rigged with excessive anti-competitive pricing practices (IPP) that are severely 
constraining the growth of the manufacturing industries. The DMR (2011) calls for an 
increase of competition in the local steel industry as one of the interventions to curb this 
behaviour.  
Jourdan (2014) recommends that the State facilitate the construction of a new stainless steel 
export plant through the reservation of ore resources, including chromite ore and iron, 
particularly for the low-Ni 200 and 400 series.  
10.8 Chromium Mineral Value Chain 
It is argued that chromium value addition can be increased through the establishment of a 
chromium  value chain cluster in the metallurgical, chemical and refractory industries, and 
likewise establish a value chain cluster of miners, smelters, HRD, R&D institutions in order 
to develop chromium value-added projects and tackle the obstacles, bottlenecks and 
constraints felt by the entire value chain. The intended consequences of this type of value 
addition are expected to yield sustainable job creation (Jourdan, 2014, p.48).  
Jourdan (2014) further recommends that developing local technology through RDI funding 
can strengthen the chromium value chain. This is intended to develop competitive solutions 
to technological challenges at all steps of the chromium mineral value chain as well as to 
develop new chromium-based products that play to the country’s resource strength. 
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10.9 Addressing the Chromite ore export ban 
The challenge currently is imposing a ban when South Africa has not adequately addressed 
the lingering power constraint. Independent subject expert Jourdan (2014) is of the view that 
government should only consider imposing a ban on chromite ore exports once power is 
adequately available, or else the country will lose out whatever revenue it can potentially 
attain from the sale of this unbeneficiated ore. 
However, consideration needs to be applied in imposing export tariffs  that many states 
widely use  (e.g. China, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico, Venezuela, Mongolia, Canada and, 
historically, most OECD states) to encourage downstream beneficiation on the assumption 
that the raw mineral producer will be encouraged to transform the product into a higher 
value-added product. 
SIMS (2012) and Jourdan (2014) propose that trade tariffs be treated as an industrial strategy 
instrument, rather than a fiscal revenue instrument and consequently should be administered 
by the DTI and not the Treasury.  
In this regard, consideration should be given to the introduction of reasonable export tariffs 
on selected crude minerals or mineral-based feedstocks to facilitate the local beneficiation 
and concurrently renegotiate or terminate bilateral trade agreements that constrain the 
introduction of reasonable and judicious export tariffs on crude mineral commodities. 
However, the domestic power crisis still needs to be acknowledged and resolved urgently. 
 
SECTION 11: REFLECTIONS 
Is there merit in beneficiating the chromium mineral value chain? The paper sought to 
address this question by reflecting on the local mining industry against the political 
environment and the prevailing infrastructural constraints.  
The answer to this question remains two-sided given the many structural challenges and 
constraints with which the country is contending. However, one thing remains clear and that 
is that South Africa has the potential to grow and develop its economy beyond the current 
levels. 
By strengthening the country’s social and political institutional framework, by taking stock of 
the structural challenges and constraints, and bringing alignment between government, 
business and labour, then the country stands a chance to work towards one ideological goal 
on beneficiating materials.  
At current levels, the country cannot be said to be sufficiently competitive compared to a 
country such as China.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has confirmed the claim that a resource abundant economy does not necessarily 
imply a wealthy economy. Similarly, the case was made that good growth performance in 
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resource abundant economies is achievable as long as a country is disciplined enough to 
strengthen its institutional and policy framework in order to increase socio-economic 
standards. Good governance is therefore a prerequisite to the promotion of growth and a 
reduction in poverty.  
South Africa’s comparative advantage in chromite ore will continue to yield less than 
satisfactory economic benefits unless maximum beneficiation of ferrochrome is encouraged. 
Supporting this strategy will reinforce the economic linkages across various sectors of the 
economy. Eventually the country will move beyond being just a resource extraction economy 
to a knowledge-based economy specializing in higher-value added activities. In order for this 
to happen, overall transformation is needed across all sectors of the economy – from 
business, government, financial, labour, research and development, and infrastructure 
expansion.  
Although electricity has been highlighted as a key constraint to the chromium mineral value 
chain, it is not the only primary concern. In other words, even if the power issue was 
rectified, the challenges and constraints listed in the discussion are still critical factors which 
may limit the extent to which the chromium value chain is developed.  
 Furthermore, if the government’s objective is to direct the country towards 
reindustrialisation, both minerals upstream and downstream beneficiation need to be 
prioritised so as to ensure that more value addition to chromite ore (or any mineral resource) 
takes place domestically before it is exported. Doing this ensures greater economic value, 
participation and employment creation. 
The Minerals Energy Complex (MEC) needs to be transformed from its current form of 
driving profits and into a driver of growth and development through maximising all the MEC 
linkages (fiscal, backward, forward, knowledge and spatial). South Africa is not doing well 
on this basis, and more needs to be done through good governance (SIMS, 2012, p.55). 
The lack of policy integration and coordination within government departments, the mining 
and manufacturing sectors and labour is a clear developmental challenge. Unless resolved, 
this will continue to impede the creation of mineral linkages across the economy and thus 
exacerbate unemployment and the income disparity between the rich and the poor.  
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Appendix B: The Vision of the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) 
 
The NIPF holds the following vision for the domestic economy: 
• To facilitate diversification beyond the country’s reliance on traditional commodities 
and non-tradable services. This requires the promotion of increased value addition per 
capita characterised particularly by movement into tradable goods and services that 
compete in export markets as well as against imports 
• To intensify South Africa’s industrialisation process and move towards a knowledge-
based economy 
• To promote a more labour-absorbing industrialisation path to focus on tradable 
labour-absorbing goods and services and economic linkages that accelerate 
employment creation 
• To promote a broader-based industrialisation path that supports and drives the 
inclusion of historically disadvantaged people and marginalised regions into the 
mainstream industrial economy 
• To build the country’s productive capabilities in order to contribute to the African 
continent 
Source: Department: Trade and Industry, A National Industrial Policy Framework, pp. 2 
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